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Consumption Property in the Sharing 
Economy 
Shelly Kreiczer-Levy* 
Abstract 
Various doctrines from different areas of the law provide special legal 
protection for property that is produced and used for personal use, creating 
the legal category of “consumption property.”  Zoning, criminal procedure, 
discrimination, foreclosure and bankruptcy, taxes, and eminent domain all 
treat property for consumption differently than commercial property.  
Recently, a new social phenomenon known as the sharing economy allows 
owners to rent out personal assets such as a room in their home, their 
private car, a bicycle, and even pets.  The sharing economy challenges the 
foundational distinction between privately used property and commercial 
property and leads to fragmentation of uses and symbolic meanings.  This 
fragmentation raises new questions: What are the boundaries of intimacy in 
the realm of modern consumption?  How should the law regulate business 
transactions in intimate locations?  This Article presents the category of 
personal consumption property, argues that the sharing economy profoundly 
challenges it, and then offers new ways to reinvent this category by 
introducing the framework of consumption property as a nexus of 
connections.  The new framework also has numerous legal implications 
ranging from fair housing law and public accommodations law to taxes, 
business licenses, and other regulatory regimes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A significant distinction in the law differentiates between property that 
is designed, produced, and purchased for private consumption and personal 
use and commercial property, a platform for multiple transactions and 
exchange.1  This distinction—though not often mentioned or discussed2—
has proven influential in shaping legal doctrines in property, criminal 
procedure, zoning, and privacy law.3  Loosely affiliated with the personhood 
theory,4 and based on values such as self-development, freedom, autonomy, 
and privacy, certain types of private property have received special treatment 
and enhanced legal protection,5 creating the category of “consumption 
 
 1. See infra Part II. 
 2. A distinction between privately used consumption property and productive property was 
made by Adolf Berle to warn against the concentration of productive property in the hands of 
corporations.  The focus of the claim is on productive property and the perils of the corporation.  See 
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
xxiii, xxviii-xxix (rev. ed. 1991); Adolf A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (1965); see also infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra Parts II, IV. 
 4. See infra notes 52–63 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
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property.”  This distinction between personal consumption and commercial 
property is not only based on their different contribution to human values, 
but is also rooted in the foundational dichotomies between the intimate and 
commercial, the private and public, the personal and impersonal.6 
Recently, a new economic phenomenon has been gradually changing the 
rules of the game.7  The sharing economy has taken the media, social 
networks, and public discourse by storm.8  It is an alternative form of 
consumption based on collaboration in the production, creation, or use of 
products and services.9  With that collaboration now simplified and 
redefined by technological advances and online communication, people are 
able to share, barter, lend, rent, swap, and gift10 their property.  The sharing 
economy allows owners to rent out assets such as a car, a home, a bicycle, or 
even pets to strangers using new forms of peer-to-peer markets.11  As a 
social trend, the sharing economy is gaining momentum.12  Forbes estimated 
3.5 billion dollars in revenue flowed through the sharing economy in 2013.13  
Airbnb, a site that allows people to rent out houses for short-term periods, 
has facilitated over two million room rentals since its foundation in 2008 
according to one estimate.14  In addition, it currently includes more than 1.5 
million listings in 190 countries and 34,000 cities.15  Car sharing sites, such 
 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See BETH BUCZYNSKI, SHARING IS GOOD: HOW TO SAVE MONEY, TIME, AND RESOURCES 
THROUGH COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION 2 (2013). 
 8. See RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF 
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010) (discussing the sharing economy); Rachel Botsman, The 
Case for Collaborative Consumption, TED (May 2010), http://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_ 
the_case_for_collaborative_consumption?language=en; see also BUCZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 2.  
 9. See BUCZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 2. 
 10. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 8, at xv; see BUCZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 2. 
 11. Peer-to-peer (P2P) markets are markets where trade occurs between peers.  See, e.g., 
Anindya Ghose, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis & Arun Sundararajan, Reputation Premiums in Electronic 
Peer-to-Peer Markets: Analyzing Textual Feedback and Network Structure, PROC. ACM SIGCOMM 
2005 3D WORKSHOP ON ECON. PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEMS (2005), 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1080207.  
 12. See BUCZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 2. 
 13. Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES (Jan. 23, 
2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-unstoppable-
rise-of-the-share-economy/. 
 14. Benjamin G. Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com 2 
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2377353#%23. 
 15.  About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last visited Nov. 1, 2015).  For 
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as RelayRides and Getaround, are also gradually gaining popularity.  
RelayRides is available in 2,300 cities and 300 airports.16  Other sites 
facilitate sharing of household possessions, tools, and bikes.17 
The growing success of such collaborative consumption enterprises calls 
into question the foundational distinction between privately used property 
and commercial property.18  If people rent out their homes, cars, bikes, drills, 
and ladders for money, these properties are possibly no longer personally 
and individually used.19  As privately used property becomes a site for 
commercial transactions, presumably there is reason to question its 
contribution to self-development, autonomy, privacy, and intimacy.  The 
conceptual framework of consumption is fragmented into discrete units of 
use with different symbolic meanings that include consumption and 
production.20  This fragmentation raises new challenges to longstanding 
legal doctrines: What are the boundaries of property’s intimacy in the realm 
of modern consumption?  How should the law regulate business transactions 
in intimate locations? 
Furthermore, consumers who prefer to use—rather than own—a car, a 
drill, or a bike challenge the perception that possession of property reflects 
and shapes personhood and contributes to self-development and autonomy.21  
Traditional conceptualizations of typical personal possessions are becoming 
less relevant to new patterns of use, consumption, and production.22  Their 
long-established core as protecting privacy and freedom becomes 
fragmented, exposed, and in need of a new legal framework.23  This Article 
presents the conceptual challenge to the distinction and offers an improved 
vision for the category. 
 
different estimates, see Edelman & Luca, supra note 14, at 2. 
 16. Yuliya Chernova, Peer-to-Peer Car Rental Startup RelayRides Hopes to Escape Silicon 
Valley Bubble, WALL STREET J. (June 14, 2014, 9:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2014/ 
06/24/peer-to-peer-car-rental-startup-relayrides-hopes-to-escape-silicon-valley-bubble/.  
 17. See NEIGHBORGOODS, neighborgoods.net (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). 
 18. This Article does not deal with all types of sharing economy transactions, as Part III explains. 
 19. Cf. Nicole Stelle Garnett, On Castles and Commerce: Zoning Law and the Home-Business 
Dilemma, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1211 (2001) (discussing the challenge that home 
businesses pose to the traditional concept of the home). 
 20. See infra Part IV.A. 
 21. On deconstructing legal categories see J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal 
Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 744 (1987). 
 22. See infra Part V. 
 23. See infra Part V. 
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Responses to the challenges prompted by the sharing economy could 
lead down one of two potential paths.  A possible course of action is to 
constrain the phenomenon by means of legal regulation in order to restore 
traditional categories.24  This path was chosen by several local governments 
in an attempt to make certain collaborative consumption transactions 
illegal.25  A second path is to dismiss the distinction between commercial 
and personal consumption property altogether.26  According to this view, a 
consumption property category is obsolete in this era of collaborative 
consumption; therefore, sharing economy transactions should be treated as 
commercial transactions for all intents and purposes.27  This Article argues 
in favor of a third approach, which strives to reconstruct the category and its 
boundaries.28  Although the current distinction is inaccurate, arcane, and 
strict, at its core it has some explanatory and justificatory force.  
Distinguishing among different assets based on their contribution to 
autonomy, dignity, or freedom is what typifies a rich and nuanced legal 
system. 
Instead of dismissing the category, this Article calls for its reinvention.29  
Rather than focusing on the intimate-commercial dichotomy, this new 
conceptualization of the personal consumption property category is sensitive 
 
 24. See OFF. OF THE N.Y. ATT’Y GEN., AIRBNB IN THE CITY (Oct. 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/ 
pdfs/AIRBNB%20REPORT.pdf. 
 25. See id.; Julie Bort, Airbnb: 124 New York Airbnb Hosts “May Be Flagrantly Misusing Our 
Platform”, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-gives-ag-info-on-
124-ny-hosts-2014-8; see also Lauren Frayer, Uber, Airbnb Under Attack in Spain as Old and New 
Economies Clash, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 29, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/ 
07/29/327796899/uber-airbnbunder-attack-in-spain-as-old-and-new-economy-clash (describing the 
tension between tourism and taxi drivers’ associations attempts to regulate “share economy” services 
and the individuals who rely on such services for primary or additional income); Brian Summers, 
Airbnb’s Short-Term Rentals Break Law in Los Angeles, Says City Memo, DAILY BREEZE (Mar. 21, 
2014), http://www.dailybreeze.com/business/20140321/airbnbs-short-term-rentals-break-law-in-los-
angeles-says-city-memo; Brad Tuttle, 7 Cities Where the Sharing Economy Is Freshly Under Attack, 
TIME (June 9, 2014), http://time.com/money/2800742/uber-lyft-airbnb-sharingeconomy-city-
regulation. 
 26. On challenges to legal categories, and subsequently, suggestion to dismiss the category see 
infra notes 244–438 and accompanying text. 
 27. Cf. Adrian Glick Kudler, LA Airbnb Landlords Going to Have to Start Paying Their Taxes, 
L.A. CURBED (Sept. 9, 2014), http://la.curbed.com/archives/2014/09/la_airbnb_landlords_going_to_ 
have_to_start_paying_their_taxes.php (stating that Los Angeles will begin collecting hotel taxes 
from Airbnb hosts). 
 28. See infra Part VI. 
 29. See infra Part VI. 
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to the complexity of human interactions and economic activities.  Personal 
consumption property should be understood as an intermediate environment 
between the private, secluded, homogenous—and hence intimate—space 
and the public, regulated, commercial space.30  The promise of an 
intermediate space lies in the possibilities it affords: new types of 
transactions and interactions and a unique set of personal and social benefits 
and costs. 
The idea of a nexus of connections allows individuals to shape their 
personal space and provides an opportunity to engage with different 
people—friends, neighbors, strangers, and the community at large—in a 
variety of ways, including altruistic gift giving, commercial exchange, and 
the many shades of gray in between.  Of course, the potential is not always 
fulfilled.  The sharing economy is an intricate phenomenon that warrants a 
careful approach, one that appreciates both its potential and its risks.31 
This vision supports a new legal framework.  It advocates a complex set 
of legal rules that focus on the unique attributes of an intermediate space, 
instead of banning the sharing economy,32 regulating transactions such as 
commercial property,33 or otherwise ignoring the activity.34  This vision 
suggests that the values that underlie the category, namely intimacy, 
personhood, privacy, and dignity, should be reconfigured to fit the era of 
modern consumption.  Because the distinction between consumption and 
commercial property centers on use,35 the law should reflect how multiple 
forms of use manipulate the values that various doctrines set out to protect.36  
The role of intimacy, autonomy, or privacy is different across legal 
doctrines, such as local regulation, eminent domain, insurance, fair housing, 
and public accommodations. 
Some doctrines remain untouched by changing patterns of use as long as 
 
 30. See infra Part V. 
 31. See infra notes 149–55 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Frayer, supra note 25. 
 33. See Kudler, supra note 27. 
 34. Cf. Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Governmental Policy: 
The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy” 1 (Jan. 14, 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript),  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2549919 (stating that there is an 
assumption that “if the sharing firms win these fights, their future will be largely free from 
government regulation,” but then arguing that this assumption is “almost surely wrong”). 
 35. See infra Part III.B. 
 36. See infra Part VI. 
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the core use is personal.37  Yet, many other doctrines are still based on the 
assumption of consumption property as an intimate location.  Consider, for 
example, the case of fair housing.38  In 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that the Fair Housing Act39 did not apply to shared living 
situations and, hence, neither to advertisements seeking roommates.40  The 
decision was based on the privacy of relationships inside the home and the 
right to intimate association.41  In intimate locations, owners hold the 
prerogative to choose with whom to share their property.42  The sharing 
economy introduces short-term multiple rentals, thereby blurring the 
distinction between a business transaction and an intimate choice of a long-
term roommate.43  This changes the meaning and function of intimacy in 
property law.  Intimate locations, such as the home, the car, and personal 
items, are no longer limited to sharing with close relations, but may include 
commercial interactions with strangers.44  Yet anti-discrimination rules still 
generally assume that consumption property precludes commercial 
transactions.45  The new conceptualization provides a more nuanced account 
of the category and the doctrines that support it. 
This Article provides guidelines to distinguish among different legal 
doctrines that support the consumption property category.46  In addition, two 
types of legal doctrines are discussed in depth: (1) the boundaries of freedom 
of intimate association in property transactions, namely fair housing and 
public accommodation law, and (2) taxation and regulation.47 
Part II defines the category of personal consumption property and its 
legal significance, setting the boundaries for our exploration.  In explaining 
the contours of this category, this Article will present it at its best, 
highlighting its most compelling arguments.  As the argument of this Article 
 
 37. See infra notes 444–500 and accompanying text. 
 38. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1216 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
 39. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2012). 
 40. Fair Hous. Council, 666 F.3d at 1222. 
 41. Id. at 1220–21. 
 42. See infra Part VI.A. 
 43. See infra notes 148–55 and accompanying text. 
 44. See BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 8, at xii. 
 45. For public accommodation laws see Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public 
Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1448 (1995). 
 46. See infra Part VI. 
 47. See infra Part VI. 
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progresses, critiques of the category will be introduced and discussed.  In 
addition, as we will see, not all types of consumption property receive the 
same protection or equally contribute to values such as autonomy, 
personhood, or freedom.  The home is probably the strongest example of the 
category; it is revered by various doctrines and theories and understood as a 
shelter and a safe haven from the outside world.48  It will thus serve as a 
paradigmatic example throughout this Article.  Other personal consumption 
properties might be less central to legal theory and practice, but still build on 
the assumption of private use. 
Part III presents the sharing economy phenomenon, distinguishing 
between major types of sharing economy and elaborating on the function of 
sharing sites such as Airbnb, car sharing sites, and NeighborGoods, which 
serve as prototypical examples of this Article’s argument.  Part IV then 
explains the challenge the sharing economy poses to personal consumption 
property.  By contrasting two seemingly antithetical concepts—the home 
and the hotel—this Part details the rise and fall of the home as a pure shelter, 
detached from business and commercial interaction, and the fragmentation 
of the concept of the home into multiple uses.  It also discusses the access 
revolution and consumers’ preference to bargain for localized short-term use 
rather than own property.  Part V reinvents the category of personal 
consumption property as an intermediate space, a platform for various 
relations borrowing from theories of public space and urban planning.  It 
explains the connection between the sharing economy, home, public space, 
and urban planning.  Part VI explores the legal implications of the analysis.  
Finally, Part VII offers concluding remarks. 
II. PERSONAL CONSUMPTION PROPERTY: THE SELF AND BEYOND 
A central legal distinction is the divide between property that is 
designed and purchased for personal use and commercial property.  While 
the latter is exchanged for monetary value, the possession of the former 
property involves, in some cases, self-development, autonomy, freedom, and 
privacy.49  The distinction between these two categories is not explicit, but is 
supported by a number of theories and doctrines, as this Part details.50  
 
 48. See infra notes 80–81, 103 and accompanying text. 
 49. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959–60 (1982). 
 50. See infra notes 148–264 and accompanying text. 
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Although each of these rules employs different justifications for the 
distinction, and therefore slightly different divisions, taken together they 
reflect a clear legal classification system. 
First of all, the distinction evokes Margaret Radin’s seminal work on 
property and personhood.51  Radin argued that people need to hold certain 
possessions in order to achieve self-development.52  She distinguished 
between fungible assets that do not warrant special protection and 
personhood property, suggesting “a hierarchy of entitlements: [t]he more 
closely connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement.”53  A key 
example is the home.54  The home is closely connected to personhood, 
according to Radin, because it is a “scene of one’s history and future, one’s 
life and growth.”55  The car is also part of the same list because cars are “the 
repository of personal effects, and cars form the backdrop for carrying on 
private thoughts or intimate relationships, just as homes do.”56 
Property’s role in the achievement of personhood and self-development 
is twofold.57  First, people define themselves at least partly by what they 
have.58  When a person changes, structures, or uses an object, according to 
the claim, she cements her identity in the object.59  She has to acknowledge 
her responsibility when she changes the property, since the process is 
irreversible.60  Second, objects tell us something about their owners.61  
Objects reveal an owner’s likes and dislikes, her tastes and preferences,62 her 
 
 51. Radin, supra note 49, at 957. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 986. 
 54. Id. at 991. 
 55. Id. at 992. 
 56. Id. at 1001. 
 57. Id. (noting the two avenues for answering the normative question of whether an object should 
be recognized as a reflection of personhood). 
 58. Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 768 (2008) 
(“[I]t is clear that between what a man calls me and what he simply calls mine the line is difficult to 
draw.  We feel and act about certain things that are ours very much as we feel and act about 
ourselves . . . .”). 
 59. JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 372 (1988).  
 60. Id. at 364–65. 
 61. See Dudley Knowles, Hegel on Property and Personality, 33 PHIL. Q. 45, 56 (1983) (noting 
that people “identify [them]selves through the medium of [their] property and . . . accord others 
equivalent status”). 
 62. Id. at 56–57. 
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status in life,63 or the choices she has made.64  Our property says something 
about us to the world and, at the same time, helps us shape an image of 
ourselves.65  Think of personal possessions, such as clothes, books, and 
furniture.  These objects allow owners to project their personality outwards 
and structure their experiences inwards.66 
However, the Radinian distinction focuses on the personal meaning of 
an asset, not on its primary function and use.67  The home, car, bike, or 
ladder can be used personally without becoming intertwined with one’s 
personhood.68  Because personhood theory is essentially subjective,69 it does 
not apply equally to similar types of property.70  What the category of 
consumption property determines instead is whether the property has been 
purchased and designed for personal use or is a platform for commercial 
transactions and exchange.  To illustrate the point, consider a similar 
distinction by Adolf Berle, one of the leading theorists on corporate 
governance.71  Berle distinguishes between productive property that is 
“devoted to production, manufacture, service[,] or commerce” of goods and 
consumption property that is an expression of personality.72  According to 
his argument, consumption property protects individual freedom, whereas 
productive property represents corporate power and is a threat to freedom.73  
Berle recognizes a separation between consumption and production not only 
as part of an economic theory, but also as different categories of property.74  
But because Berle was primarily concerned with the concentration of 
 
 63. Malla Pollack, Your Image Is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the 
Public Domain—with an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1392, 1397–1406 (1993) (describing the significance of consumer goods as a means of 
“carry[ing] and communicat[ing] social meaning”). 
 64. See Davidson, supra note 58, at 799. 
 65. Id. at 760. 
 66. See Pollack, supra note 63, at 1430. 
 67. Radin, supra note 49, at 962. 
 68. See Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth 
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 927–28 (2010). 
 69. Id. at 927–28, 927 nn.113–14. 
 70. See Radin, supra note 49, at 959. 
 71. See generally AMNON LEHAVI, THE CONSTRUCTION OF PROPERTY: NORMS, INSTITUTIONS, 
CHALLENGES 179–85 (2013); Berle, supra note 2. 
 72. See Berle supra note 2, at 4. 
 73. LEHAVI, supra note 71, at 180. 
 74. Id. at 182. 
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productive property in the hands of corporations,75 his argument 
distinguishes between individual and corporate owners and is less focused 
on the type of property.76  Moreover, he was less interested in consumption 
property and did not fully develop the category.77 
The distinction between consumption and commercial property is also 
supported by legal doctrines and further justified by the values of freedom, 
privacy, and autonomy.  These values justify the special legal protection of 
property that is designed for personal consumption rather than business 
use.78  The home, as opposed to a house, is the clearest example of this 
unique legal treatment.79  The home is perceived in legal scholarship and 
case law alike as a special locus for individual autonomy, dignity,80 freedom, 
and privacy.81  The home is construed as a place free from the interference of 
others,82 and thus the home is treated differently from houses for commercial 
use.83  In criminal law, for example, the punishments for invasion of a home 
“generally exceed the penalties imposed for invasions of other types of 
property.”84  In addition, the Fourth Amendment,85 search and seizure law, 
and general case law all reflect a commitment to privacy in the home.86 
Another important value supporting the distinction between 
consumption and commercial property is intimacy.  It is by now almost 
 
 75. Berle, supra note 2, at 4; see also LEHAVI, supra note 71, at 180. 
 76. LEHAVI, supra note 71, at 180–81. 
 77. Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property, Power, and Freedom: Reich’s “New Property” at Fifty 22, 
30–31 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).  In addition, Berle’s distinction does not 
accommodate small economic producers and is mainly concerned with the divide between 
individuals and corporations.  Id. at 23 (noting that Berle “misapprehend[ed] the significance of the 
sorts of small economic producers”). 
 78. See Stern, supra note 68, at 907. 
 79. The home has an elevated status compared to other kinds of personal property, and it serves 
as the prototypical (though not sole) example of the thesis.  See Radin, supra note 49, at 991–92. 
 80. Eduardo Peñalver, Property Metaphors and Kelo v. New London: Two Views of the Castle, 
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2971, 2972–73 (2006). 
 81. See D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 259 
(2006). 
 82. See Lisa M. Austin, Person, Place, or Thing?  Property and the Structuring of Social 
Relations, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 445, 450 (2010). 
 83. Barros, supra note 81, at 259 (“[H]omes are different from other types of property when 
issues of personal security, freedom, and privacy are at stake.”).  In addition, Radin contends that the 
rights of landlord are fungible property.  Radin, supra note 49, at 992–94. 
 84. Barros, supra note 81, at 262. 
 85. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 86. Barros, supra note 81, at 269–75, 269 n.57, 270 n.58. 
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cliché to say that property is a platform of human relations.87  Within this 
general claim, consumption property is presumed to foster intimate relations 
founded on familiarity, closeness, and trust.88  Sharing one’s home, car, or 
books with family members, close friends, and neighbors remains within the 
contours of this general paradigm.89  The home is often understood as a site 
that hosts intimate relations90 and functions as a social and cultural unit of 
interaction between guests, neighbors, and the people living in the home.91  
This type of sharing is considered to be part of the extended self92 because 
self-development requires intimate relations and social interactions.93  
However, commercial property supports a different type of relations, rooted 
in arm-length transactions and based on mutual economic interests rather 
than personal connections.94  This distinction supports current housing 
 
 87.  Relational and communal property scholars have similarly argued strongly for an 
understanding of property as a platform for relations.  See generally Gregory S. Alexander, 
Intergenerational Communities, 8 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 21, 21 (2014) (arguing that property 
owners owe an obligation to provide future generations with the necessary tools to complete “life-
transcending projects” and future generations have a duty to carry out such projects); Gregory S. 
Alexander & Eduardo Peñalver, Properties of Communities, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 
127–28 (2009) (discussing the mutual dependence of the individual and their community); Jennifer 
Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162, 162–63 (1991) 
(evaluating the boundary-like structure of property law and advocating for a change in the legal 
metaphor in order to further human autonomy); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in 
Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 617–18 (1988) (examining society’s reliance on relationships by 
analyzing the legal protections and exposures of such reliance interest). 
 88. Cf. Austin, supra note 82, at 449. 
 89. See id. at 450 (discussing the home as a site that hosts meaningful intimate relations); see 
also Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, The Informal Property Rights of Boomerang Children in the Home, 74 
MD. L. REV. 127 (2015) (discussing co-residence as a home-sharing community).  
 90. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH xi, 
1 (reprt. ed. 2008) (defining the household as a “set of institutional arrangements, formal or 
informal, that govern relations among the owners and occupants of a particular dwelling space”); see 
also Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth, 
116 YALE L.J. 226, 229–30 (2006) (analyzing informal household relations). 
 91. Lorna Fox, The Meaning of Home: A Chimerical Concept or a Legal Challenge?, 29 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 580, 600–01 (2002); Judith Sixsmith, The Meaning of Home: An Exploratory Study of 
Environmental Experience, 6 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 281, 291–92 (1986); Sandy G. Smith, The 
Essential Qualities of a Home, 14 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 31, 33 (1994); see also Shelley Mallett, 
Understanding Home: A Critical Review of the Literature, 52 SOC. REV. 62, 68 (2004) (defining the 
home as a “‘socio-spatial system’ that represents the fusion of the physical unit or house and the 
social unit or the household”).  
 92. Russell Belk, Sharing, 36 J. CONSUMER RES. 715, 726–27 (2010). 
 93. Austin, supra note 82, at 449. 
 94. See, e.g., Belk, supra note 92, at 719 (implying that a less personal business relationship has 
a greater impersonal commodity character than that of a more personal business relationship). 
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discrimination and public accommodations regulations, which allows 
owners to choose with whom to share their consumption property but 
regulates their decision to share in a place of business.95  Although intimacy 
as a property value has not been addressed in the literature, it lies at the core 
of the consumption property category.96 
Another set of legal doctrines celebrates possession of the home as 
worthy of special protection.  A legal focus on possession supports the 
personal consumption aspect of a home, since possession is the primary 
personal use of the property.97  Protection of possession of the home has 
been justified based on the values of dignity and personhood98 and is 
overwhelmingly supported by legal doctrines.99  From bankruptcy100 to post-
foreclosure rights of redemption101 and just cause eviction rules,102 the law 
grants possession of the home preferential protection, so much so that 
Stephanie Stern refers to it as “residential protectionism.”103 
Although possession of a car, bike, or ladder is not uniquely protected, 
the law still singularizes personal property used for private consumption.  
Property tax law in most states distinguishes between personal property used 
for business purposes and property for personal use.104  Some states limit 
tangible property tax to business-related property.105  Other states—such as 
Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Montana, and Oklahoma—
 
 95. See infra Part VI. 
 96. See, e.g., Mallett, supra note 91, at 84 (indicating that the home “can be associated with 
feelings of comfort, ease intimacy, relaxation and security and/or oppression, tyranny and 
persecution”). 
 97. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 49, at 990.   
 98. See infra Part VI. 
 99. See infra notes 258–70 and accompanying text. 
 100. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (2012); see also Jay A. Kroese, Undersecured Residential 
Mortgage Cramdown Under Chapter 13: Receiving the Attention of Both the Supreme Court and 
Congress, 18 J. CORP. L. 737, 764 (1993) (noting that “[h]ome ownership is a highly desirable 
societal policy [supported by] the federal government”). 
 101. See, e.g., Graves v. Wayman, 859 N.W.2d 791, 793 (Minn. 2015) (discussing generally a 
homeowner’s exercise of the right of redemption to cancel a foreclosure sale); see also JESSE 
DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 618–19 (7th ed. 2010) (discussing the history of the equitable and 
statutory rights of redemption). 
 102. See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Nunez, 952 N.E.2d 923, 930–31, 933 (Mass. 2011). 
 103. See Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (2009); infra Part VI. 
 104. CCH STATE TAX LAW EDITORS, 2009 U.S. MASTER PROPERTY TAX GUIDE 7, 45–46 (Fred 
Conklin ed., 2009). 
 105. Id. 
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employ a personal property ad valorem tax, but exempt personal use 
property, household goods, or furniture.106  Also, many state laws include 
statutory exemptions that limit a creditor’s ability to collect from debtors in 
judgment enforcement.107  Some states exempt property for personal use, 
such as clothes, books, musical instruments, and furniture.108  Similarly, 
federal bankruptcy exemptions include a car, household furniture and goods, 
and books that are personally used.109  These exemptions allow debtors to 
maintain their dignity and support recuperation for their family.110 
To sum up, there are several rules that treat property designed, 
purchased, and used for personal consumption differently than other types of 
property.111  The category is supported by different justifications, based on 
individual values, including personhood, autonomy, and freedom.112  Yet the 
individual focus does not exclude cooperation.  The idea of sharing is not 
foreign to this category.  Although altruistic sharing poses no real threat to 
the category of personal consumption property, commercial sharing does not 
accord with the foundations of the category.113 
Indeed, property can be used to extract profit when owners transfer 
partial use rights such as licenses or easements to others in exchange for 
monetary compensation.114  Depending on the type of transaction and its 
effect on possession, exchange value is perceived as antithetical to the 
concept of personal consumption property.115  The underlying assumption is 
 
 106. Id.  
 107. JAMES J. BROWN, JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT §§ 10.1, 10.9 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 2015). 
 108.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4902(a) (2015) (including family bible, school books, 
family library, family pictures, pianos, and sewing machines among exemptions); see also HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 651-121 (2015) (including all necessary household furnishings, appliances, clothing 
and books that are used by the debtor and his family as exemptions); BROWN, supra note 107, §§ 
10.19, 10.24 (examining Kansas and Massachusetts exemptions).  But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 
4902(c) (“This provision shall not apply to persons who keep sewing machines for sale or hire.”). 
 109. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2012); BROWN, supra note 107, §§ 10.09–10. 
 110. BROWN, supra note 107, § 10.09. 
 111. See supra notes 95–110 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Austin, supra note 82, at 450. 
 113. See supra notes 38–58 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, 32 CARDOZO. L. REV. 1369, 1375–77, 1388–89 
(2011) (arguing that use is derivative of ownership, which is a concept that runs counter to the 
current structure of property law). 
 115. See, e.g., Belk, supra note 92, at 719 (arguing that there is a sliding scale between fungibility 
and personal connections with regard to personal property: as the transaction becomes more personal 
to the purchaser, such as in cases of secondary goods sold, the good loses its “impersonal commodity 
character”).  This commodity character affects the value for both the seller and purchaser.  Id.   
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that personal consumption property is designed and produced for personal, 
rather than commercial, use.116  If the property is used to extract significant 
exchange value, its unique qualities as personal use property diminish.117  
For example, Radin contends that when a homeowner rents her house to a 
tenant, the rights of the landlord become fungible property and the 
occupational rights of tenants should be characterized as personhood 
property instead.118  This explains why mixing commercial and personal use 
could prove confusing for this legal category.  Conceptually, it turns the 
property into something completely different, as Part IV explains.119 
Finally, it is important to clarify that the distinction between 
consumption and commercial property, while important and pertinent to 
current legal reality, is by no means hermetic.  Even the most powerful 
distinctions have fuzzy edges.  One important complexity concerns 
homeownership.120  There is a complex interplay between possession, 
consumption, and value.121  Most clearly, homeowners consume housing.122  
Housing consumption also includes price protection and the options of 
decorating and landscaping.123  Consequently, some argue that 
homeownership is a form of production of housing services and an 
investment in real estate.124  It is clear, however, that homeowners who live 
in their home use their property primarily as a source of consumption.  In 
addition, possession includes personhood values of an asset: the personal 
space it affords and its value in securing autonomy, dignity, and privacy for 
its possessors.125  This is the added value that supposedly distinguishes 
personal possessions from other assets.126 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Radin, supra note 49, at 992–93. 
 119. See infra Part IV. 
 120. See infra notes 122–25 and accompanying text. 
 121. See infra notes 122–25 and accompanying text. 
 122. Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1054–59 (2008). 
 123. Id. 
 124. JAMES M. BUCHANAN, PROPERTY AS A GUARANTOR OF LIBERTY 35 (Charles K. Rowley ed., 
1993); Fennell, supra note 122, at 1054–59. 
 125. See Fennell, supra note 122, at 1054–59.  Fennell bundles these two levels together as the 
consumption value of the home as opposed to the home as an investment bundle.  Id. 
 126. Id. at 1054–63. 
[Vol. 43: 61, 2015] Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
76 
III. THE SHARING ECONOMY 
A. The Phenomenon: Background and Motivations 
It is now time to consider the sharing economy phenomenon and its 
social and economic implications.  The term “sharing economy” refers to a 
variety of economic practices that are based on collaborative forms of 
consumption.127  Collaborative consumption is about the “sharing, bartering, 
lending, trading, renting, gifting and swapping” of products and services, 
simplified and redefined by technological advances and online 
communication.128  As the trend gains momentum,129 social advocates 
passionately argue that it will revolutionize long-established conventions 
about economic production, consumption, and ownership.130  Slogans such 
as “usage trumps possession,”131 “access is better than ownership,”132 and 
that the sharing economy is “as big as the Industrial Revolution”133 mark the 
ambition of such advocates who are dedicated to transforming not only 
economic practices but also social processes. 
This new trend relies on owners that are willing to share and users that 
prefer to use rather than own.134  From the owner’s perspective, there are 
certain types of goods that have excess capacity when they are privately 
owned and consumed.135  Because the excess capacity is not used, certain 
types of goods are systematically underexploited.136  Think of a car, for 
example.  Suppose someone only uses their car in winter but never in the 
summer.  During the summer the car is simply parked in the driveway.  
Through sites such as Getaround, JustShareIt, and Turo, this person could 
benefit from the car’s use value not only in winter, but also in the summer, 
 
 127. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 8, at 71–75. 
 128. Id. at xv. 
 129. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 130. See infra notes 131–33 and accompanying text. 
 131. BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 8, at 97–98. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Danielle Sacks, The Sharing Economy, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 18, 2011, 1:05 AM), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/1747551/sharing-economy (interviewing Rachel Botsman).  
 134. Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a 
Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 311–13 (2004). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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on Thursdays, or during the evenings.137  Whenever the car is being used, it 
can be rented out for money.138  In addition, cars have another untapped 
potential.  Many commuters drive to work alone, even though their car can 
seat four or five passengers.  To make use of this excess capacity, car 
owners can simply carpool.  As of 2003, carpooling was the second-largest 
commuter transportation system in the United States.139  The mechanisms for 
carpools vary tremendously.  They can involve explicit barter, cost 
sharing,140 or payments.141  For example, in Northern Virginia and the San 
Francisco Bay area, solo drivers are picking up strangers at known meeting 
points in order to take advantage of high occupancy vehicle lanes.142 
From the user’s perspective, potential users of goods and services prefer 
to pay or barter for use of a product, rather than purchase the product.143  
Reasons for this preference include obtaining access at a lower cost144 and 
the flexibility of using items in different locations, which brings storage 
advantages because storage is the owner’s responsibility.145  There are also 
social and psychological gains, including making a personal statement that 
denies the traditional market ownership model and supports sustainability.146  
At the same time, there are also costs associated with sharing: the price of a 
shared product, the cost of learning to use unfamiliar products repeatedly, 
and the cost of searching for new products.147 
In economic terms, new technologies and online markets have 
significantly lowered transaction costs for short-term use of personal 
assets.148  Reduced costs allow owners and users to benefit from excess 
 
 137. See About Us, JUSTSHAREIT, http://www.justshareit.com/jsi/website/about.do (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2015); How It Works, GETAROUND, https://www.getaround.com/tour (last visited Nov. 3, 
2015); How Turo Works, TURO, https://turo.com/how-turo-works (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).  
 138. See, e.g., How Turo Works, supra note 137 (discussing how to list one’s car). 
 139. See Benkler, supra note 134, at 281 (citing John Pucher & John L. Renne, Socioeconomics of 
Urban Travel: Evidence from the 2001 NHTS, 57 TRANSP. Q. 49, 53 tbl.3 (2003)). 
 140. Id. at 282. 
 141. Id. at 282–83. 
 142. Id. at 284. 
 143. Cait Poynor Lamberton & Randall L. Rose, When Is Ours Better Than Mine?  A Framework 
for Understanding and Altering Participation in Commercial Sharing Systems, 76 J. MARKETING 
109, 111 (2012). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Benkler, supra note 134, at 282–83. 
[Vol. 43: 61, 2015] Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
78 
capacity of the property easily and efficiently.149  Because the sharing 
economy is based mostly on contractual arrangements and users typically do 
not hold property rights, there is little danger of either overuse or underuse 
of the asset.  Therefore, the notorious tragedies of the commons150 or the 
anticommons,151 resulting from too many owners having privileges of use152 
or rights to exclude153 respectively, do not pose real threats here.154  
However, the sharing economy can also lead to negative externalities for 
neighbors and the community.155 
Although the sharing economy is only in its initial stages of 
revolutionizing consumption, it is important to study its effect on property 
law.  First, it continues gaining momentum.156  At this rate, and considering 
the very real motivations that support the phenomenon, one can anticipate its 
continuing rise.  Second, the phenomenon poses a challenge already in these 
fairly early stages because it challenges the basic conventions of 
consumption and production of individual owners.157 
B. Categories in the Sharing Economy 
The term sharing economy embraces a wide variety of sharing 
transactions.158  The differences are remarkable.  In order to make sense of 
the phenomenon as well as define the scope of inquiry, I suggest three main 
guidelines for characterizing various patterns of sharing.  The first principle 
distinguishes between transactions that share products and transactions that 
provide services.159  Peer-to-peer markets can include owners that share their 
property, such as cars, drills, bikes, and houses, or people wishing to share 
their time, skills, and expertise via sites like Skillshare160 and TaskRabbit.161  
 
 149. Id.  
 150. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
 151. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in Transition From Marx to 
Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). 
 152. Hardin, supra note 150. 
 153. Heller, supra note 151, at 623. 
 154. See Benkler, supra note 134, at 304–05. 
 155. See infra note 397 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
 157. See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
 159. See BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 8, at 71–72. 
 160. See About Us, SKILLSHARE, https://www.skillshare.com/about (last visited Nov. 3, 2015) 
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While sharing skills can be just as revolutionary as sharing property in terms 
of consumer behavior, only the latter is innovative in terms of property 
theory.  The sharing of property—in particular consumption property that is 
routinely employed for private use—presents a challenge to key property 
theory assumptions, as will be discussed in the next Part.162 
The second principle distinguishes between commercial-based sharing 
and sharing by private individuals.163  Consider the difference between 
Zipcar164 and Turo.165  Both sites provide creative ways to save on 
transportation costs.166  Zipcar offers car-sharing services for cars owned by 
a commercial company.167  Turo is a peer-to-peer service that allows private 
owners to rent their cars.168  Both models reflect consumers’ preferences to 
use rather than own, and in this sense they both challenge the premise of 
longtime attachment to personal possessions.169  In essence, users reject the 
need for continuing entanglement with certain types of property.170  Despite 
the similarities from the consumer’s perspective, there is an important 
difference between the two business models.  Because the owner in Zipcar is 
a commercial company, there is no consumption property involved in the 
transaction.171  Their cars are business inventory par excellence.  In Turo, at 
least some of the vehicles available are personal cars rented out by 
individual owners when they are not using them.172 
A third principle concerns the distinction between payments for goods 
 
(describing how Skillshare is an online learning community designed to help users master real-world 
skills through project-based classes).  Skillshare’s “mission is to . . . dismantl[e] the traditional 
barriers to learning so that anyone, anywhere in the world, can learn whatever they set their minds 
to.”  Id. 
 161. See How TaskRabbit Works, TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/how-it-works (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2015) (“TaskRabbit is the smart way to get things done by connecting you with 
others in your neighborhood.”).  With TaskRabbit, users can outsource errands to a list of taskers 
that have been vetted.  Id. 
 162. See infra Part IV. 
 163. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
 164. See How to Zip, ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com/how (last visited Nov. 3, 2015). 
 165. See TURO, supra note 137. 
 166. See id.; ZIPCAR, supra note 164. 
 167. See ZIPCAR, supra note 164. 
 168. See TURO, supra note 137. 
 169. See id.; ZIPCAR, supra note 164. 
 170. See generally Lamberton & Rose, supra note 143 (discussing property entanglement). 
 171. See ZIPCAR, supra note 164. 
 172. See TURO, supra note 137. 
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or services and bartering, or in-kind swapping.  All of the above examples 
assume payment in return for use rights or services provided.  As part of the 
consumption revolution, and following an environmental agenda, many 
online sites facilitate swapping in-kind goods.  One can swap clothes on 
SwapStyle, books on PaperBackSwap, and any other items on Tradeaway.173  
Because in-kind swapping is based on barter, the parties to the transaction do 
not deal with use rights and the owner does not retain ownership rights.174  It 
therefore does not pose a challenge to the legal doctrines framing 
consumption property. 
To sum up, this Article focuses on a particular type of sharing economy 
transaction in order to discuss the clearest challenge to the concept of 
consumption property: physical goods that are privately owned and 
purchased for individual use, but then shared in exchange for monetary 
compensation in peer-to-peer markets. 
C. Sharing of Consumption Property 
Three types of online sharing sites serve as prototypical examples for 
the argument.175  The first is Airbnb.176  The site offers an online tourist 
marketplace that allows owners to share their homes for a fee.177  Hosts 
usually offer short-term rentals of the home or spare rooms for travelers.178  
Airbnb accommodates a vast array of hosting options, including: shared 
accommodation where the owner and travelers live under the same roof; 
short-term rentals of the entire home when the owners go on vacation; and 
rentals of houses and apartments that the hosts do not actually live in.179  At 
one end of the spectrum, there are housing units that are not being used as 
homes at all and pose little threat to core concepts of consumption property; 
 
 173. See How to Swap Books, PAPERBACKSWAP, http://www.paperbackswap.com/help/how_to_ 
swap_books.php (last visited Nov. 3, 2015); SWAPSTYLE, http://www.swapstyle.com/ (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2015); What is Trade or Barter?, TRADEAWAY, http://www.tradeaway.com/abouttrade.php 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2015). 
 174. See Benkler, supra note 134, at 304–05. 
 175. See infra notes 179–206 and accompanying text. 
 176. See AIRBNB, supra note 15. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Georgios Zervas, Davide Proserpio & John W. Byres, The Rise of the Sharing Economy: 
Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 26 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Mgmt., Research Paper 
No. 2013-16, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2366898. 
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however, at the other end there are hosts sharing an intimate space with 
strangers and living with travelers.180  The introduction of new touristic 
possibilities through Airbnb has blurred the distinction between home and 
hotel.181  If the home becomes part of the hospitality sector, is it still a home 
at all?  If tourists are paying to stay at someone’s home, is it really the same 
as a hotel? 
The categorization is further complicated by comparison to another 
online sharing site called Couchsurfing.182  Couchsurfing also offers 
accommodation for travelers, but unlike Airbnb this accommodation is 
free.183  The difference between gift exchange and market exchange184 
proves significant in terms of visual and discursive analysis185 and in terms 
of users’ expectations.  In the Couchsurfing community, participants, or 
“surfers,” are redefined as friends with a friendship ranking (such as good 
friend, close friend, or best friend).186  In contrast, while the personal 
dimension is also evident on Airbnb, the site emphasizes the city and rooms 
available.187  Additionally, hosts on Couchsurfing are expected to interact 
with their guests and show them the city.188  On the other hand, Airbnb 
travelers are expected to be relatively independent.189  For these reasons, 
Couchsurfing poses less of a threat to the concept of consumption property, 
at least in theory.  Although it does challenge the social dichotomy between 
friends and strangers, it creatively redefines travelers as friends and keeps 
sharing within traditional boundaries: altruistic and friendly.  This framing 
 
 180. Id. at 7–8. 
 181. Id. at 4–5. 
 182. Share Your Life, COUCHSURFING, http://www.couchsurfing.com/about/about-us/ (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2015). 
 183. Natalia Yannopoulou, Mona Moufahim & Xuemei Bian, User-Generated Brands and Social 
Media: Couchsurfing and Airbnb, 9 CONTEMP. MGMT. RES. 85, 87 (2013). 
 184. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 151 (1993); PETER M. 
BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 89 (1964); Barry Schwartz, The Social Psychology of 
the Gift, 73 AM. J. SOC. 1, 2 (1967) (discussing the premise of gift exchange); see also Kieran Healy 
& Kimberly D. Krawiec, Custom, Contract and Kidney Exchange, 63 DUKE L.J. 645 (2012) 
(complicating the distinction between gift and market exchange using the example of kidney 
exchange). 
 185. See Yannopoulou et al., supra note 183, at 85. 
 186. Id. at 87. 
 187. Id. at 88. 
 188. See Tapio Ikkala & Airi Lampinen, Defining the Price of Hospitality: Networked Hospitality 
Exchange via Airbnb, CSCW COMPANION 173, 177 (2014). 
 189. See id. at 176. 
[Vol. 43: 61, 2015] Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
82 
defuses any danger that the home will function as a hotel and longstanding 
distinctions are preserved.190 
The duality embedded in the market of touristic home sharing has 
generated a fierce public debate.  In New York, the Attorney General has 
decided to enforce hotel zoning laws and occupancy taxes on certain Airbnb 
hosts.191  According to New York regulations, owners or tenants cannot 
legally rent their apartments out for less than thirty days unless they are also 
living in the property.192  In San Francisco, Airbnb announced that it would 
collect and remit a 14% hotel occupancy fee.193  These steps prove that the 
conceptual boundaries of home and hotel have become fuzzy.  As the next 
Part will show, the home is a revered and protected locus in American 
law.194  The blurring of boundaries challenges the necessity and applicability 
of the concept of “the home.”195 
The second prototypical example is car sharing.196  Turo connects car 
owners with possible renters who need a car but prefer not to own one.197  
Some car-sharing sites offer specific campus or neighborhood sharing in 
various countries.198  Indeed, private cars have limited usage per household 
and it is estimated that cars spend about 90% of their time parked in parking 
lots.199  Car sharing allows owners to maximize utility of the property.200  
This rationale is not restricted to cars.201  There are various underused items 
 
 190. See Yannopoulou et al., supra note 183, at 89. 
 191. Ilya Shapiro & Gabriel Latner, New York’s Pursuit of Airbnb Is an Attack on Privacy, DAILY 
CALLER (Dec. 18, 2013, 10:43 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2013/12/18/new-yorks-pursuit-of-airbnb-
is-an-attack-on-privacy/. 
 192. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4 (McKinney 2011). 
 193. Dara Kerr, Airbnb Begins Collecting 14% Hotel Tax in San Francisco, CNET (Sept. 17, 
2014, 12:23 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/airbnb-begins-collecting-14-hotel-tax-in-san-
francisco/. 
 194. See infra Part IV. 
 195. See infra Part IV. 
 196. See Eun Ji Cho & Liat Rogel, Urban Social Sustainability Through the Web: Using ICTS to 
Build a Community for Prospective Neighbors, I.C.T.4.S. 167, 168 (2013). 
 197. How Turo Works, supra note 137. 
 198. See Cho & Rogel, supra note 196, at 168 (noting the existence of international car-sharing 
sites, as well as a “campus-based service . . . operating at Stanford University, UC Berkeley, and 
UCLA”). 
 199. Id. (identifying cars as an under-utilized product in the United States, where, as of 2011, cars 
spent about “90[%] of the time sitting idle in parking lots”). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id.  
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in every household.202  NeighborGoods is a site that allows people that live 
nearby to share their goods either for a fee or entirely for free.203  Certain 
personal items—such as drills, ladders, lawnmowers, and bikes—are 
individually owned but only rarely used.204  Indeed, as the site’s explanatory 
video exclaims, “does everyone on your block need to own a 
lawnmower?”205  Because many of the items are underutilized, the potential 
economic benefits of such enterprises are considerable.206 
These three sites facilitate the expanded utilization of items’ excess 
capacity by creating peer-to-peer markets for private individuals.  All of 
these sites involve personal consumption property that is designed, 
marketed, and purchased for private use and is traditionally shared only with 
family and close friends.207  These sites have developed ways to expand the 
personal consumption property’s use.  The next Part will explain how this 
purpose poses a threat to the concept of personal property. 
IV. THE CHALLENGE 
Inasmuch as the sharing economy movement will continue to gain 
momentum and become a significant social phenomenon, it presents a 
challenge to the legal concept of personal consumption property.  Traditional 
conceptualizations of typical personal possessions, such as the home, the car, 
and household goods, are losing not only their centrality to the practice of 
property law but also their legal coherence.  Their long-established core has 
become fragmented, exposed, and is now in need of a new legal framework.  
This challenge stems from two main sources that correspond to the two 
perspectives of sharing economy transactions: the owner’s perspective and 
 
 202. See NEIGHBORGOODS, supra note 17; cf. id. (suggesting that “[n]ot only physical assets, but 
also intangible assets, such as time and skill, can be shared (or exchanged)” to increase efficiency). 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. NeighborGoods, How NeighborGoods Works, VIMEO (2010), https://vimeo.com/10659908.  
 206. See Benkler, supra note 134, at 308 (“[T]he owner [of a shared item] has an opportunity to 
benefit if [the owner] can get any positive utility from allowing access to the excess capacity.”); see 
also Anders Fremstad, Gains from Sharing: Sticky Norms, Endogenous Preferences, and the 
Economics of Shareable Goods 2 (Univ. of Mass. Amherst Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 
2014-02, 2014), http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1167&context=econ_ 
workingpaper (“There are ‘gains from sharing’ when the cost to the lender is less than the benefit to 
the borrower.”). 
 207. See supra notes 177–204 and accompanying text. 
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the user’s perspective.208  This Part begins with the former and then moves 
on to the latter. 
A. Conceptual Fragmentation 
The concept of personal consumption property refers to possessions that 
are deeply associated with self-development, personhood, and autonomy.209  
The sharing economy splits the home, the car, or household possessions into 
discrete units of use with different symbolic meanings.  Alongside personal 
use, these assets are exploited to produce profit, to interact with strangers, 
and to allow widespread impersonal and disposable use.210  These seemingly 
different functions undermine the coherence of the concept.   
To illustrate this argument, think of the home.  The home is an 
important example because of its centrality in modern American culture as a 
symbol of an intimate haven, where the individual and a family are secured 
from the outside world.211  Although homeownership is fragmented in 
economic terms into consumption and investment,212 and even though 
American housing ethics include pluralist values,213 the internal workings of 
the home remain, as a legal concept, personal and intimate.214  In other 
words, the personal use of the home and intimate shared living space lie at 
the core of the legal regulation of the home.215 
The most striking portrait of the home as a secure shelter is found in 
zoning laws.216  Zoning laws define the home as a sanctuary, physically 
 
 208. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
 209. See supra Part II. 
 210. See The Rise of the Sharing Economy, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy. 
 211. See JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS 
TRANSFORMING PRIVACY (2009) (describing the American cultural and legal perception of the home 
as a secure, private, and individualized “castle”); Barros, supra note 81, at 259–60; Kreiczer-Levy, 
supra note 89, at 139–40; Stern, supra note 103, at 1095–96. 
 212. See Fennell, supra note 122, at 1053–54. 
 213. Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 511, 513–19 (2007) (identifying five distinct housing ethics in American law: “(1) 
housing as an economic good, (2) housing as home, (3) housing as a human right, (4) housing as 
social order, and (5) housing as one land use in a functional system”). 
 214. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Barros, supra note 81, at 255–56. 
 215. See Barros, supra note 81, at 259–61 (suggesting that “the unique nature of the home justifies 
additional legal protection in some, but not all, circumstances”). 
 216. Cf. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1195–96 (noting the American conceptualization that “‘home’ 
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separated from the realities of commerce and urban life.217  The main 
purpose of zoning codes is to organize land use of private lands by dividing 
them into “zones.”218  As several scholars have noted, this division creates a 
hierarchy of land uses.219  At the top of the pyramid are residential zones, 
especially those reserved for the single family dwelling.220  Zoning laws 
protect homes from incompatible uses and defend residential areas against 
outside threats.221  In filtering incompatible uses, zoning ordinances achieve 
two purposes: they preserve the home-business distinction and regulate 
familial life.222 
First, zoning codes in many municipalities specifically restrict home-
based businesses.223  As Nicole Stelle Garnett explains, some municipalities 
prohibit all home occupations in residential zones,224 others provide a list of 
prohibited occupations,225 and still others distinguish between professionals 
and nonprofessionals in granting permission to work from home.226  Second, 
certain local zoning ordinances restrict use in residential neighborhoods to 
narrowly defined single-family units.227  They regulate intimacy within the 
home and push out nontraditional living arrangements such as 
intergenerational families,228 college roommates,229 foster residence,230 and 
 
and ‘work’ are incompatible”).  See generally Joel Kosman, Toward an Inclusionary Jurisprudence: 
A Reconceptualization of Zoning, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 82 (1993) (describing the importance of 
the American understanding of the home as private and secure). 
 217. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1201. 
 218. Id. at 1206. 
 219. See, e.g., Kosman, supra note 216, at 79 (noting that zoning laws prioritizes residential 
“zones”). 
 220. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1201–02 (noting that zoning laws prioritized “physically set[ting] 
apart [the home] from the realities of the urban work-a-day world”); see also Kosman, supra note 
216, at 79 (describing the modern zoning practice of prioritizing protection of residential districts 
which are “perceived as the cornerstone of American society of values”). 
 221. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1206. 
 222. See id. at 1195–96. 
 223. Id. at 1207. 
 224. See, e.g., MESA, ARIZ., ZONING ORDINANCES ch. 11, art. II, §§ 11-4-4, 11-5-5 (2014). 
 225. See, e.g., CORPUS CHRISTI, TEX., ZONING ORDINANCES art. I, § 3-1.36 (2010). 
 226. See, e.g., JEFFERSON PARISH, LA., COMPREHENSIVE ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 40, art. I, § 40-3 
(2015); see also Garnett, supra note 19, at 1207–08. 
 227. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495–96 (1934). 
 228. Id. at 498–99. 
 229. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2–3 (1974); Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi, 
568 A.2d 888, 889 (N.J. 1990). 
 230. City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 313 N.E.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. 1974). 
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group homes.231  Although courts have struck some of these ordinances 
down as violations of the freedom of association,232 the regulation of 
residential units remains a prominent pillar of the home as a sanctuary.  In 
short, zoning laws exclude both commercial production and non-familial 
living arrangements from the home.233  It thus serves to protect intimacy 
from the market and from strangers.234 
Privacy in the home is another legal field that solidifies the vision of 
home as a castle.235  The four walls of the home define the boundaries of 
“spiritual territoriality.”236  Case law has strongly maintained that a search in 
the home cannot be conducted without a warrant.237  In a similar vein, in 
Kyllo v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a thermal imaging scan 
of the home was an illegal search.238  These cases often assert that the 
sanctity of the home and the right of the individual to retreat to his private 
dwelling are key elements of American constitutional law.239  In addition, 
case law emphasizes the intellectual and emotional needs that the privacy of 
one’s home, as the private realm of family life, protects.240 
This perception is actually fairly new,241 since for most of human history 
the household was a center of productive activity and there was no clear 
 
 231. Berger v. New Jersey, 364 A.2d 993, 995 (N.J. 1976). 
 232. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 498–99 (“On its face [the regulation] selects certain categories 
of relatives who may live together and declares that others may not.”). 
 233. See supra notes 220–30 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra notes 220–31 and accompanying text. 
 235. See SUK, supra note 211, at 2; see also Barros, supra note 81, at 259–60; Robert M. Rakoff, 
Ideology in Everyday Life: The Meaning of the House, 7 POL. & SOC’Y 85, 85 (1977); Smith, supra 
note 91, at 32; Stern, supra note 103, at 1100.  
 236. John Messerly, Comment, Roommate Wanted: The Right to Choice in Shared Living, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1964 (2008). 
 237. Barros, supra note 81, at 267–68. 
 238. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2001) (holding that “thermal-imaging 
observations of the intimate details of a home are impermissible”). 
 239. Id. at 31–37 (emphasizing the importance of protecting the intimate details of the home); 
accord Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583–85 
(1980); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); Silverman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
 240. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U.S 557, 565 (1969) (affirming the right of an individual to “satisfy his intellectual and 
emotional needs in the privacy of his own home); Brooke Wright, Comment, Fair Housing and 
Roommates: Contesting a Presumption of Constitutionality, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1341, 1356–57 
(identifying the right to privacy, especially within the home, as a “fundamental liberty”). 
 241. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1199. 
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distinction between the home and the community.242  The transition from a 
preindustrial society to a modern economic society brought with it a clear 
theoretical division between the domestic sphere and the market sphere.243  
The home has been reconstructed to mean a shelter from the cold outside 
world, the tensions of commerce, and the backstabbing nature of 
competition.244  Defined as a shelter, the home is understood to be 
commerce-free and antithetical to the idea of production.245  Feminist 
scholars have criticized this vision, dubbed the separate spheres ideology, 
because it subjects and restricts women to the roles of homemaker and 
caretaker.246  Despite the prominence of such accounts, this division is still 
influential in the legal conceptualization of the home as intimate and secure 
for numerous reasons.247 
Now consider the sharing economy.248  Airbnb poses a threat to the 
vision of the home as a pure, private, and revered sanctuary.  It invites 
commercial transactions and strangers into the home.249  True, home 
business poses a threat to the commerce-free environment as well, as Garnett 
eloquently argues.250  Yet the sharing economy poses a bigger, more 
fundamental threat than working from home.  Airbnb is not only a type of 
 
 242. Id.; Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2–3 
(2010); Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies 
and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 756–57 (2010) 
(describing the history of the American household as “an explicitly economic unit housing both 
human reproduction and material production); Duncan Kennedy, Savigny’s Family/Patrimony 
Distinction and Its Place in the Global Genealogy of Classical Legal Thought, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 
811, 832 (2010). 
 243. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1201–02. 
 244. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (1983). 
 245. Id. (“The . . . home [was] seen as [a] safe repositor[y] for the virtues and emotions people 
believed were being banished from the world of commerce and industry.”).  But see Jan De Vries, 
The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution, 54 J. ECON. HIST. 249, 255–57 (1994) 
(describing the household as a “unit of . . . production and labor power”). 
 246. Olsen, supra note 244, at 1510–12. 
 247. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Family Formation and the Home, 104 
KY. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (providing a progressive vision of the home and focus on stability, 
intimacy, and interdependence in cohabitation); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 
MICH. L. REV. 189, 191 (2007) (providing feminist account and critique); see also Stern, supra note 
103, at 1109 (“The personhood theory of the home maintains that an individual constitutes herself as 
a person through a secure and ongoing relationship with certain property.”). 
 248. See Sacks, supra note 133. 
 249. See Geron, supra note 13. 
 250. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1209–17. 
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business; it is also a different mode of sharing one’s residence.251  It brings 
people into one’s home, not as visiting customers, but as temporal, casual 
roomers.252  According to Viviana Zelizer, living with others creates a 
certain type of intimacy.253  She defines intimacy as knowledge of and 
attention to details that would, were they to become public, create 
embarrassment or damage the individual’s social esteem.254  Living with 
strangers mixes the distant with the intimate.  However, unlike renting a 
room to a permanent tenant, the sharing economy opens up the possibility 
for short-term, casual renting patterns.  The home becomes a platform for 
interactions and social exchange with strangers that come and go.255  The 
home, household goods, or the car turn into an open environment that is less 
intimate, private, and secure. 
To rephrase the argument in Radin’s terms, personhood property—be it 
the home or the car—distinctively contributes to self-development because 
it is a repository of personal thoughts, history, and memories of 
relationships.256  The sharing economy complicates this concept because it 
involves production, decentralization, and widespread use.257  A possible 
rebuttal is that when owners share their property with strangers as part of the 
sharing economy, their property is not personhood property in the Radian 
sense.  This rebuttal helps keep the property category neat and clear, but it 
ignores the potential of individuals to shape their own private environment 
and invite in various types of interactions.  Moreover, it may only be true as 
long as the sharing economy phenomenon is sporadic and uncommon.  
Inasmuch as the phenomenon will continue to gain momentum, it is bound 
to alter the way we think about this type of property. 
A more salient configuration of the same argument is that the sharing 
economy phenomenon obscures the concept of home by blurring the line 
 
 251. How It Works, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/getting-started/how-it-works (last 
visted Dec. 16, 2015). 
 252. Garnett, supra note 19, at 1209–17. 
 253. VIVIANA ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 213–14 (2007) (arguing that living in a 
household almost always engages household members in intimacy because cohabitants have 
information and attention that if made public could damage the reputation and welfare of other 
cohabitants).  
 254. Id. at 14–15. 
 255. See Geron, supra note 13. 
 256. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 257. See BUCZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 2; supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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between a home and a hotel.  A hotel is “an establishment that provides 
lodging and usually meals, entertainment, and various personal services for 
the public.”258  As part of the hospitality business, a hotel is open to the 
public259 and is characterized by hospitable, yet impersonal, interaction.260  
This dichotomy is a fairly new one, since historically the inn evolved from 
the private house.261  It was common for householders to receive a stranger 
as a guest for the night.262  Yet, under the current legal regime, the categories 
of hotel and home are perceived as antithetical.263  They rule each other out, 
with the home receiving superior legal protection.264  Similar, though less 
forceful, antithetical categories can be applied to cars265 and household 
possessions.266 
The sharing economy challenges this type of antithetical reasoning.267  
This social phenomenon unsettles a set of predetermined dichotomies.268  
The hierarchy of home and hotel relies on the public-private dichotomy.269  
The home is a private arena, shielded from prying eyes, while the hotel is 
 
 258. See Hotel, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hotel (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2015).  The legal definition of zoning law equally emphasizes the presence of 
lodging and food on the premises and the accommodation of strangers and travelers.  See, e.g., 
MARK BOBROWSKI, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW § 12.12[O] 
(2d ed. 2002).  It is kept public and open to the public.  See JOHN E. H. SHERRY, THE LAWS OF 
INNKEEPERS: FOR HOTELS, MOTELS, RESTAURANTS, AND CLUBS 9 (3d ed. 1993). 
 259. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012); MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 258. 
 260. Cf. SHERRY, supra note 258, at 9 (explaining that inns developed from private houses). 
 261. Id. at 6. 
 262. Id. 
 263. See supra notes 226–40 and accompanying text. 
 264. Although the police cannot search an occupied hotel room without a warrant, hotel workers 
can enter the room to provide services and, in certain cases, if the guest is disturbing other guests 
(occasionally upon calling the police).  See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); United States 
v. Jeffers 342 U.S. 48 (1951), overruled on other grounds by Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978);  
SHERRY, supra note 258, at 198–99. 
 265. There are distinct differences between a private car and rental cars or taxis.  Natasha Meyers, 
Note and Comment, ELRAC, Inc. v. Masara: Is the New York Court of Appeals Undermining the 
Concept of Permissive Use Under the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law?, 18 TOURO L. REV. 409, 
413 (2002) (noting that “car rental agencies are not in the same position as private car owners”). 
 266. Personal possessions can be contrasted with pawnshops.  Pawnshops don’t rent items, but 
maintain possession of items as security for a loan.  I use the example in order to draw a line 
between a distant commercial use and personal private use. 
 267. See Balkin, supra note 21, at 744–46. 
 268. See, e.g., Messerly, supra note 236, at 1963. 
 269. Id. 
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open to the public.270  If privacy is about keeping information concealed, and 
intimacy is about attention to and knowledge of sensitive details,271 then the 
home is certainly more private than a hotel.  However, if owners open up 
their home to strangers, then the home’s privacy is compromised and it is in 
fact open to the public in a manner similar to a small hotel.272 
Yet privacy can also mean the ability to choose “one’s social relations 
free from social constraints.”273  In fact, historically the word was associated 
with familiarity with others away from the discipline of family and the 
formality of public officials.274  The understanding of privacy as a choice is 
very much connected to the idea of private property.275  Leading theorists of 
property theory highlight the owner’s prerogative to exclude others from the 
owner’s property as the core of ownership and property law.276  This right to 
exclude can be restated to mean that the owner can choose to include people, 
share property, and allow others to participate in the process of shaping its 
contours.277  Despite important critiques of the exclusion approach278 that 
dispute its premise both descriptively279 and normatively,280 it demonstrates 
 
 270. See id. (explaining the public-private distinction in the context of the home). 
 271. See ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 14–15. 
 272. See supra notes 270–71 and accompanying text. 
 273. Austin, supra note 82, at 452. 
 274. Id. (quoting Roger Chartier, Introduction: Community, State, and Family: Trajectories and 
Tensions, in A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: PASSIONS OF THE RENAISSANCE 400 (Roger Chartier ed., 
Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1989)). 
 275. See Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the Limits of 
the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REV. 889, 890 (2003) 
(discussing the Fourth Amendment as a protection of property). 
 276. See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 103 (1997); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and 
Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1857, 1891 (2007); Ernest J. 
Weinrib, Poverty and Property in Kant’s System of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 808 
(2003).  
 277. Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 859 (2014); see also Katz, supra 
note 276, at 278 (defining the owner as the “supreme agenda setter for the resource”). 
 278. See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37–55 (2011) (providing a 
critique of the centrality of exclusion in property law); see also Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-
Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); Gregory S. 
Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S. Underkuffler, A Statement of 
Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2009); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as 
Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889 (2005); Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estate: Property Law in 
a Free and Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009). 
 279. See DAGAN, supra note 278, at 35–37; Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1853, 1855 (2012). 
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the intricacy of the concept of privacy in the realm of property.281  If privacy 
is about control, an Airbnb host achieves privacy by managing her social 
relations.  The property becomes a platform for social exchange and social 
interaction.  When an owner decides to continuously share the asset for 
whatever purpose—economic or social—she opens it up as a site for 
interaction and communal activity.  She moves further away, however, from 
the vision of the home as a secluded shelter. 
Additionally, the hierarchy is also based on the distinction between 
personal and impersonal, business and intimacy.  The assumption is that the 
hotel is a commercial enterprise whereas the home is personal, intimate, and 
a locus of familial relations.282  This dichotomy is also based on the 
distinction between the sphere of domestic bliss and the sphere of 
commercial market transactions.283  This approach strictly separates the 
intimate from the commercial as two incompatible “hostile worlds.”284  The 
sharing economy, however, allows homes to have multiple symbolic roles.  
Thus, the home becomes a site for commercial transactions concerning 
shared living arrangements.285  These shared residences are short-term, 
casual, and do not provide opportunity for personal connection.  The home 
becomes at the same time commercial and intimate, personal and 
impersonal, private and public, moving away from a clear and coherent 
conception.286 
It is tempting to think of the sharing economy as a retreat to collectivism 
or an anti-consumerism movement.287  As I explain in the next Part, this is 
not an accurate description of the phenomenon, and the reality is more 
complex.288  The true challenge to property theory in the modern economy 
lies in rediscovering the socioeconomic potential of private assets, which, 
despite having historical roots, has been transparent in previous decades. 
 
 280. See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
 281. See DAGAN, supra note 278, at 38. 
 282. See Messerly, supra note 236, at 1966–67. 
 283. Olsen, supra note 244, at 1497–98. 
 284. Cf. ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 22–23 (arguing that the “feared contamination [between the 
separate spheres] runs in both directions”); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating 
Commercial Intimacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1223, 1240 (2013). 
 285. Cf. De Vries, supra note 245, 255–57 (comparing the historical analysis of the industrious 
revolution and the role of household production). 
 286. See Messerly, supra note 236, at 1958–61. 
 287. See infra notes 405–12 and accompanying text. 
 288. See infra Part IV.B. 
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This multifaceted structure depletes the concept of personal 
consumption property of its compelling socio-legal symbolic power.  This 
can result in two opposite conceptual outcomes.  One is that the concept of 
property becomes devoid of meaning.  The other is that the concept of 
personal consumption property deserves a richer, more complex 
understanding. 
B. Access or Ownership 
The sharing economy is not just about the owners of homes, cars, and 
other valued possessions who are looking for new ways to make use of their 
property.  It is equally about users: consumers who choose not to purchase 
property, but rather to bargain for short-term use.289  They pay per use of a 
car, bike, or drill only when they need to use it.290  This consumer trend 
poses a fundamental challenge to the personal consumption property 
argument.291  Indeed, a number of scholars have criticized Radin’s argument, 
questioning the essentialism and political background of the connection 
between property and personhood and highlighting its subjective nature.292  
Stephanie Stern argues that there is little evidence from psychological 
research to support the argument that the home constructs identity.293  
Rather, the home expresses and maintains identity at best.294  What 
contributes to human flourishing, according to her argument, are not mere 
possessions, but rather social interactions.295  Stephen Schnably has further 
claimed that “[t]he ideal of the home is not one simply constructed by 
individuals, but is one that has been actively fostered by the state and other 
ʻprivate’ actors wielding significant social power.”296 
A different critique of the personhood theory is that attachment to 
material possessions draws, at least partly, on comparisons to others.297  
 
 289. See Sacks, supra note 133. 
 290. Id. 
 291. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.   
 292. See Fox, supra note 91, at 581–86 (responding to the argument that attachment to the home is 
subjective).  
 293. Stern, supra note 103, at 1110. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory of Property 
and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 373–74 (1993). 
 297. Davidson, supra note 58, at 759–60. 
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Property signals relative status because material possessions mark and 
reinforce economic, social, and cultural hierarchies.298  This potential 
interrelation between personhood and possessions may fuel competitive 
consumption.299  Indeed, ecological and anti-consumerism motivations steer 
individuals away from ownership as a source of personal meaning.300 
The sharing economy seems to fit perfectly with this movement.301  
Facilitated by online communication, the sharing economy is driven by the 
power of social media to utilize excess capacity of property.302  For users, 
social networks facilitate efficient short-term use by significantly lowering 
transaction costs.303  Instead of ownership, consumers find other means for 
achieving and projecting personal identity.304  As Rachel Botsman and Roo 
Rogers argue in their popular book about collaborative consumption, online 
social networks provide new ways of self-expression.305  People share what 
they are doing (Twitter), what they are reading (Shelfari), and who their 
friends are (Facebook).306  They further explain: “[A]s our online ‘brands’ 
define ‘who we are’ and ‘what we like,’ actual ownership becomes less 
important than demonstrating use or use by association.  We can now show 
status, group affiliation, and belonging without necessarily having to buy 
physical objects.”307 
The outcome of this consumer trend results, for several reasons, in a 
gradual tendency towards access to property in preference to ownership of 
 
 298. Id. at 760–61. 
 299. Id. at 799–800. 
 300. Stephen Zavestoski, Environmental Concern and Anti-Consumerism in the Self-Concept: Do 
They Share the Same Basis?, in EXPLORING SUSTAINABLE CONSUMPTION: ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 173, 175–76 (Maurie J. Cohen & Joseph Murphy eds., 2001).  
See generally KIM HUMPHREY, EXCESS: ANTI-CONSUMERISM IN THE WEST (2013) (detailing anti-
consumerism with the western nations). 
 301. Lamberton & Rose, supra note 143, at 109. 
 302. Benkler, supra note 134, at 338.  
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738, 738–41 (2012) (describing the role of websites in the sharing economy). 
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266 (2013) (describing the effect of technology and the sharing economy on the balance of power 
between consumers and firms). 
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property.308  Jeremy Rifkin made this projection almost fifteen years ago in 
his influential book The Age of Access.309  According to his argument, 
ownership of market goods becomes outdated in the hyper-capitalist 
economy.310  Exchange of ownership is too slow of a mechanism to adapt to 
fast technological advances, information flows, and human creativity.311  In 
the new economy, “markets are making ways for networks and ownership is 
steadily being replaced by access.”312  Instead of buyers and sellers, servers 
and clients bargain for short-term access through leases, rentals, 
subscriptions, or memberships.313  Take, for example, cars.  When a dealer 
sells a car to a buyer, their relationship is limited and short-term.314  If the 
client gains access to the car in the form of a lease, however, the relationship 
is ongoing, renewable, and potentially perpetual.315  These become what 
Rifkin terms “commodifying relationships.”316  Consequently, “[w]hen 
everyone is embedded in commercial networks of one sort or another and in 
continuous association by way of paid leases, partnerships, subscriptions and 
retainer fees, all time is commercial time.”317  This description, along with 
other insights, contributes to Rifkin’s conclusion that the network economy 
leads to the commodification of time and experiences.318 
Although it is tempting to treat the sharing economy as part of the 
network economy portrayed by Rifkin, the challenge the sharing economy 
presents is quite different.  First of all, the type of sharing economy 
transactions analyzed in this Article deals with private assets owned and 
purchased for the purpose of private consumption.  It is a socioeconomic 
phenomenon whose uniqueness lies in that it concerns not only businesses 
but also individuals seeking either to lower costs of consumption or make 
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use of excess capacity.319  Second, Rifkin focused on changing patterns of 
capitalist consumption as the driving force of the network economy rather 
than the sharing among individuals at the center of the sharing economy.320  
However, this is an important characteristic that makes the phenomenon 
unique and challenging.  The sharing economy cannot be reduced to either 
Rifkin’s vision of hyper-capitalism or a utopian vision of sharing.  On the 
one hand, the sharing economy involves social and commercial networks, 
fast flows of information, and a strong focus on access.321  On the other 
hand, the sharing of property among individuals results in decreased levels 
of consumption322 and increased efficiency in the use of property.323  In this 
sense, it drifts away from prophecies of over-consumption into the realm of 
sustainability. 
Indeed, users’ preferences to share rather than own can be driven by 
economic, social, or ecological motivations324 and present a competing view 
of the relations between objects and people.  The sharing economy is thus 
entangled with the ideologies and politics of consumption, capitalism, and 
markets.325  My argument, however, is not that ownership is obsolete.  Even 
in the era of modern consumption, people still value attachments to personal 
possessions.326  The argument is that the sharing economy should direct our 
attention to multiple uses, functions, and values that are at stake here, not 
only autonomy and self-development.327 
V. REINVENTION OF THE CATEGORY 
The inherent difficulties within the concept of personal consumption 
property, now intensified by the sharing economy, can lead to the conclusion 
that the concept is obsolete.  Personal consumption property does not make 
any sense under current legal reality, if it ever did.  I would suggest not 
 
 319. See supra notes 301–04 and accompanying text. 
 320. RIFKIN, supra note 308, at 143–44. 
 321. See supra notes 301–04 and accompanying text. 
 322. See generally Boyd Cohen & Jan Kietzmann, Ride On!  Mobility Business Models for the 
Sharing Economy, 27 ORG. & ENV’T 279, 280 (2014) (describing the new popularity of sharing 
economy). 
 323. See generally Benkler, supra note 134, at 279. 
 324. See supra notes 301–02, 322 and accompanying text. 
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rushing to this type of conclusion.  Although it may be too strict, at its core 
the distinction has some explanatory and justificatory force.  Distinguishing 
among different assets based on their contribution to autonomy, dignity, or 
freedom is what typifies a rich and nuanced legal system.328  Assets have 
different economic functions and symbolic meanings.329  However, the 
notion of personal consumption property captures only a fragment of the 
fuller, more complex picture.  As the sharing economy phenomenon reveals, 
consumption property can encompass a range of uses and legal relations.330  
Therefore, the concept of an interactive personal space is more attuned to the 
variety of networks that affect the home and other personal possessions.  The 
personal use of property serves as a potential platform for additional 
interaction.  Like many challenges, the sharing economy provides an 
opportunity to redefine personal space by opening up new possibilities of 
communal and commercial interactions.331  This Part will explore these 
possibilities, and map the structural relations engendered by the sharing 
economy in an interactive personal space.  Four focal points of the 
transaction run through this analysis: (1) the owner; (2) the user; (3) the 
social and economic role of the asset; and (4) the community. 
To understand the role of the sharing economy in structuring 
relationships, it is useful to think of Zelizer’s theory of connected lives.332  
The distinction between the intimate and commercial, market and home, or 
personal and impersonal location, relies on the “hostile world” or “separate 
sphere” approach.333  This approach marks “distinct arenas for economic 
activity and intimate relations.”334  Against this approach, Zelizer points out 
that many transactions involve a mixture of economic and intimate 
characteristics.335  Furthermore, the structure of economic transaction and 
the intimacy of social relations are, in some sense, interdependent.336  
 
 328. On the importance of context-based analysis in property law, see infra note 425 and 
accompanying text. 
 329. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 58, at 761 (“[P]roperty serves as an important locus for 
symbolic meaning.”). 
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 331. See ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 3. 
 332. ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 2 (“[P]eople lead connected lives, and that plenty of economic 
activity goes into creating, defining, and sustaining social ties.”). 
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 334. Id. at 20–21. 
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According to Zelizer, as certain transactions become common, they 
transform the meaning and type of relationship by challenging former 
categories.337  Consequently, people begin to renegotiate previous social 
boundaries and distinctions.338  Zelizer cites childcare as an example: 
commercial adoption agencies, commercial childcare, and the system of 
public foster care have changed the definition of parenthood.339  This results 
in new distinctions among the birth child, adopted child, client’s child, foster 
child, and so on.340  Similarly, as the sharing economy becomes prevalent, it 
will ultimately change definitions of personal consumption property and 
offer new distinctions within the concept of home, hotel, car, household 
goods, and more.  When people choose a type of transaction, they will 
actually be choosing a type of relationship with their paying guests, 
neighbors, and community.341 
The sharing economy both structures new legal relationships and 
reshapes the meaning and function of the asset.342  A transaction’s rules, 
customs, and forms shape not only social relations but also the property’s 
nature, function, and value.343  This influences the asset’s market value, 
symbolic meaning, and physical traits.  Consider the complex system of 
property relationships that the previously discussed websites have 
developed.  The sharing economy is made possible because of vast 
technological improvements that have facilitated communication between 
owners and sharers.344  Most of these transactions are made via the Internet, 
through websites that also include reputation mechanisms.345  The user 
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 345. See, e.g., How Do Reviews Work?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/13 (last 
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writes a review on the sharing experience, the property, and the owner.346  In 
some cases, the property owner also writes a review of the sharer’s use.347  
Reputation works as a safeguard for prospective users, and it also raises the 
value of the property.348  A host on Airbnb can charge a higher price when 
her reviews are impeccable.349  Sharers participate in shaping the value and 
function of the asset by influencing the price, marketability, and even 
physical attributes.350  Indeed, owners are occasionally willing to add 
furniture, change facilities, or even own new pets to secure a positive 
review.351  Market forces and social norms thus create a voice-inducing 
participation mechanism that improves the market value and usability of 
assets.  Instead of repeat players or formal right-holders, an entire network 
of users, owners, and future users participate in the sharing economy and the 
sites that host it.352 
Moreover, collaborative consumption builds new forms of commercial 
relations.  Instead of a consumer and a seller (often a commercial company) 
there is an owner and a user.  Unlike commercial companies that rent out 
cars, for example, the owners in our cases are invested in the property 
because they are still the primary users.  The owner and the user actually 
share the consumption of the same property and the user participates in the 
utilization of the property.353  This makes property somewhat more personal, 
connected, and—as the name would suggest—collaborative. 
One must also consider the role of consumption property in the 
neighborhood or larger community.  The vision of the home as a detached 
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private territory, isolated from outside threats, is mostly an illusion.354  The 
home is influenced by the community surrounding it.355  It is affected by 
what happens outside its four walls.356  The home’s market and personal 
values are affected by schools, highways, land use, and, most of all, the 
neighborhood ambiance and composition of the community.357  This delicate 
interplay between the home and the community is layered into the 
conceptual structure of the home in law, yet the vision of this relationship is 
limited.358 
The law accommodates certain communal environments.  I refer mostly 
to residential communities, particularly common interest communities 
(CICs) that include homeowner associations, condominiums, and 
cooperatives.359  CICs rely on private rules to enforce a number of 
covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) that secure a protected 
environment.360  These restrictions deal with the aesthetic of landscape—the 
exterior of housing units, outside storage, or display of unused cars—or 
activities that affect the neighborhood.361  Although they are aimed at 
preserving the market value of dwellings and a safe neighborhood,362 these 
restrictions have broader implications.  In the name of security, privacy, and 
the social fabric, CICs create restrictions that protect the community to the 
 
 354. Nadav Shoked, The Community Aspect of Private Ownership, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 759, 
771 (2011). 
 355. LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY 
LINES 1–5 (2009); see also Shoked, supra note 354, at 771 (suggesting that “the individual and the 
private abode are meaningless when separated from their surrounding community”). 
 356. Shoked, supra note 354, at 762. 
 357. See FENNELL, supra note 355, at 1–3; Shoked, supra note 354, at 762. 
 358. See Shoked, supra note 354, at 761 (“But the state appellate court was undeterred by the 
unconventionality of the legal challenge, and it reversed the decision.  It explained that ‘even if [Ms. 
Rodriguez’s] property might experience net dollar value increases, theoretically realizable in the 
future,’ she would suffer harms, ‘including destruction of . . . neighborhood social and commercial 
fabric.’  Accordingly the court concluded that she had stated a constitutional claim.” (citing 
Rodriguez v. Henderson, 578 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991))).   
 359. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 101, at 896; see also, e.g., Uniform Common Interest 
Ownership Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 36B-1-101 to 207 (2015). 
 360. See Amnon Lehavi, Community and Property: How Property Can Create, Maintain, or 
Destroy Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 43, 57–58 (2009); David J. Kennedy, Note, 
Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on 
Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 762 (1995); Ross Thomas, Note, Ungating Suburbia: Property 
Rights, Political Participation, and Common Interest Communities, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
205, 206–07 (2012). 
 361. Amnon Lehavi, Mixing Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 137, 163–66 (2008). 
 362. FENNELL, supra note 355, at 75–80; Kennedy, supra note 360, at 765–66. 
[Vol. 43: 61, 2015] Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
100 
exclusion of others.363  As they maintain the character of community and real 
estate values, residential communities are becoming more homogenous, 
segregated, and privatized.364  Indeed, homogenous communities appear to 
be appealing to homebuyers.365  Moreover, governmental failures have led 
communities to own and operate playgrounds, swimming pools, parks, 
tennis courts, and community centers.366  Streets in neighborhoods are 
becoming private and the public space is getting smaller.367 
This new urban planning has drawn criticism.  Legal scholars are 
concerned about exclusion, segregation based on class and race, and the lack 
of pluralism.368  These legal claims fit within a larger movement of social 
critics that protest against the destruction of the public sphere.369  According 
to this claim, commercial and private spaces, such as shopping malls, gated 
communities, and other commercial venues, are replacing areas of face-to-
face interaction with people of different ages, appearances, and classes.370  
The loss of open public space creates a spatial environment characterized by 
impersonality, alienation, and commodification.371  A competing vision 
supported by these critics refers to an “ideal of community as pure 
copresence of subjects”372 or “a collective of strangers sharing equal 
regard.”373 
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More concretely, according to the social doctrine termed “new 
urbanism,” the built environment can create a sense of community.374  The 
design and planning principles of new urbanism include walkability, 
connectivity, increased density, green transportation, and mixed use.375  
These principles are thought to encourage community life.  Walkability, for 
instance, is about designing streets as public space, rather than mere voids 
between buildings, which contributes to street life, pedestrian activity, and a 
sense of place.376  Another important principle is mixed use.  Places of 
residence should be juxtaposed with places of business, shopping, and 
recreation.  This encourages integration of people of different ages, races, 
and income levels because people walk more, drive less, and have a better 
chance of meeting.377 
The mixture of residential and commercial land uses creates a 
multipurpose space where lingering is encouraged, which creates a setting 
for “repetitive chance encounters” that, in turn, builds and strengthens 
community bonds.378 
Although the sharing economy is not about city planning, there is a 
useful analogy here.  The sharing economy creates a spatial environment 
that stands between CICs’ private or semiprivate space and the public space 
advocated by the social critics.379  The sharing economy can be viewed as 
supporting an intermediate physical space between purely private and public 
spaces.380  Indeed, collaborative consumption could be a driving force that 
solidifies community ties.381  NeighborGoods and car sharing sites all 
encourage swapping, lending, and renting possessions to others who live 
nearby.382  They bring neighbors together and contribute to the unique social 
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fabric.383  The role of peer-to-peer markets in bolstering social interaction 
fits nicely with the call for reinventing the public space.384  Without 
changing the planned environment, the sharing economy expands the use of 
residential neighborhoods to include aspects of both a commercial and 
personal nature.385  In addition, peer-to-peer sharing sites encourage social 
interaction that includes personal exchanges of goods and money in a way 
that potentially crosses ages, races, and income levels.386  The sharing 
economy also promotes integration because it allows lower-income owners 
to earn money and afford housing.387 
As the sharing economy phenomenon gains force, it is hard to dispute 
that it is connecting people of various ages and statuses.388  It not only 
connects them virtually (similar to the Internet)389 but also facilitates face-to-
face communication with neighbors, the community, and beyond.390  It 
promotes commerce among individuals who often meet in person and 
become enmeshed in each other’s social environment.391  Like the traditional 
marketplace, it is a location that hosts communal interactions.392  It thus 
certainly restructures relations among neighbors and the community at 
large.393  Strangers become familiar, and friends may engage in commercial 
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transactions.394 
Yet, alongside this regeneration of the public space, the sharing 
economy is not a truly open environment.395  First, local government and 
private regulations may restrict the market for short-term tourist rentals.396  
Frequent short-term rentals may influence the noise, cleanliness, and density 
of population, and a constant flow of strangers that come and go may affect 
the atmosphere of the neighborhood,397 leading to new restrictions and 
regulations.  Second, sharing sites could de facto enhance solidarity within a 
given community but not with people outside of it.398  One unpublished 
study found that “non-black hosts earn roughly 12% more” than black hosts 
for the equivalent rental and rating, and attributes it to renters’ preference to 
rent units from non-black hosts and inaccurate inferences.399  In addition, 
some argue that Airbnb only seems to help individuals increase income; 
however, in the long run it will actually aggravate the housing crisis by 
excluding lower-income individuals from cities.400  More empirical research 
is required to see if and to what extent the sharing economy has created the 
proverbial public square, and what its possible biases are.401  New data will 
help evaluate its possible commercial and privatized aspects.402  For now, its 
familiar characteristics point to a vision of an intermediate space and 
potential new markets for interaction.403 
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http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/90223#files-area (analyzing the recent history of the sharing 
economy and suggests methods for maximizing efficient utilization of items and services). 
 398. See Edelman & Luca, supra note 14, at 9. 
 399. Id. at 9–10. 
 400. Rebecca Burns, The ‘Sharing’ Hype: Do Companies like Lyft and Airbnb Help Democratize 
the Economy?, THESE TIMES (Jan. 27, 2014), http://inthesetimes.com/article/16111/the_sharing_ 
economy_hype. 
 401. See Cho & Rogel, supra note 196, at 169. 
 402. See id. at 168–69. 
 403. Id. at 173. 
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The potential of the sharing economy to become an intermediate space 
with private and public aspects should not be confused with an anti-capitalist 
social agenda.404  Some critics insist that the sharing economy represents 
corporate capital that is monetizing a part of the social world that it 
previously avoided.405  Because Airbnb is a site that earns profit by charging 
a fee on every transaction,406 it is “a new space of capitalist exchange where 
it didn’t previously exist or predominate.”407  Turo also charges owners a 
25% commission per rental,408 and other car-sharing sites have similarly 
high commissions and booking fees.409  However, other sites are less profit-
driven, such as NeighborGoods that does not charge a fee,410 and more about 
community and solidarity.411 
The above critique accentuates the complexity of the phenomenon and 
should caution those who view the sharing economy as a manifestation of 
socialism.412  Indeed, the commercial and social aspects of the sharing 
economy are in constant tension.  The sharing economy encompasses a wide 
array of practices and transactions, some driven by solidarity and altruism, 
while others are essentially business-like transactions.413  Commercial 
sharing in intimate locations raises the concern of a world where everything, 
including one’s home, is monetized.414  This concern restates the challenge 
to the category of consumption property.  The new conceptualization of 
intermediate space allows individuals to create their own space by 
 
 404. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 400. 
 405. Id. 
 406. See NADLER, supra note 397, at 39–40.  Airbnb takes a fee of 9–15% of the reservation: the 
host pays 3%, and the guest pays the rest.  Id. at 40. 
 407. Burns, supra note 400. 
 408. Carolyn Said, RelayRides Lands $25 Million Funding to Help Car Owners Rent Idle 
Vehicles, TECH. CHRONICLES (June 14, 2014, 4:01 AM), http://blog.sfgate.com/techchron/2014/ 
06/24/relayrides-lands-25-million-funding-to-help-car-owners-rent-idle-vehicles/. 
 409. See, e.g., Getaround, Inc Fee and Commission Schedule, GETAROUND, 
https://www.getaround.com/fees (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).  
 410. See NeighborGoods FAQ, supra note 345. 
 411. See Mike Pepi, Solidarity After “Sharing:” Notes on Internet Subjects # 1, RHIZOME (June 
20, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://rhizome.org/editorial/2014/jun/20/sharing-and-solidarity/ (noting the 
distinction between peer economy and solidarity economy).  
 412. Bauwens, supra note 325, at 131–32. 
 413. Christoffer O. Hernoes, Sharing Is Everything but Caring in the Sharing Economy, TECH 
CRUNCH (Feb. 27, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/02/27/sharing-is-everything-but-caring-in-the-
sharing-economy/. 
 414. See id. 
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combining different interactions.415  The fact that the home, car, or bike is 
partially monetized does not necessarily mean that it has become completely 
commodified.416  This may be true,417 but in most cases the intimate and 
commercial exist side by side. 
Instead of stressing the socialist features of sharing, or the emotional 
and economic benefits of sharing per se,418 I argue that the sharing economy 
conceivably opens a new intermediate sphere for social interaction.419  How 
does this new intermediate space translate into a richer category for 
consumption property?  One needs to consider property as a spatial 
environment that hosts various kinds of relations.420  These relations include 
the altruistic gift exchange structure that typifies familial ties and 
friendships.421  They also include commercial ties with the greater 
community, neighbors, and strangers.422  Yet, unlike typical commercial 
transactions, the platform for interaction here is an asset that is purchased 
and used for private and personal consumption.423  The core use of the asset 
is personal use that contributes to personhood, autonomy, and freedom and 
supports intimacy.424  This core should not be disregarded because of the 
existence of commercial and quasi-commercial peripheries.  At the same 
time, one cannot ignore the peripheral commercial aspects altogether.  
Instead, a personal asset should be understood as a platform for interaction 
that serves as a nexus of connections. 
The idea of a nexus of connections creates the potential for individuals 
to shape their personal space.  Personal assets provide an opportunity to 
engage with a variety of people (friends, neighbors and strangers) and also in 
 
 415. See supra Part V. 
 416. Contra Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood, 29 VA. TAX REV. 93, 109–10 (2009) 
(identifying the problems inherent in the commodification of personal items and interactions).  
 417. See infra notes 518–23 and accompanying text. 
 418. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 572–74 
(2001) (describing the benefits of sharing). 
 419. See infra Part VI. 
 420. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 421. Dagan, supra note 416, at 130 (describing the “mutual benefits” derived from altruistic social 
exchange as “expressions of shared understandings, affections, and commitments”). 
 422. Instead of a set of dichotomies between personal and business, or between commodification 
and non-commodification, one needs to explore the normative considerations of a legal problem or 
concept.  See Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fisher, Rights for Sale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 90 (2011); Dagan & 
Heller, supra note 418, at 552–54. 
 423. See infra Part VI.A. 
 424. See infra Part VI.A. 
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a variety of ways, including altruistic sharing, commercial transaction, and 
the many shades of gray in between.425  Indeed, many owners become 
involved in collaborative consumption because of economic hardship and 
are careful in their sharing decisions.426  Yet, with the range of options 
available for individuals facing economic problems, the sharing economy 
provides a unique choice.  It provides the individual the possibility to define 
his personal space based on goals that are important to him, in particular 
sustainability and social and environmental justice.427  Personal space 
becomes a trajectory to the social, communal, commercial, and ecological 
self. 
Unlike accounts of property that emphasize social obligation,428 my 
point here is that the challenges of the sharing economy to consumption 
property are still very much a matter of individual choice.  The owner 
chooses how to shape his personal space, and he is able to redefine it 
whenever he pleases.  It is a private property regime that is governed by the 
right to exit429 and, to a lesser extent, the right to exclude.430 
However, the sharing economy—by choice of the owner—invites other 
values as well, including efficiency, sustainability, community, and 
cooperation.431  These interests and values stem from the new function of 
consumption property and should be considered in the reconstruction of the 
category, as the next Part elucidates. 
The value of the argument does not lie in its emphasis on context-based 
analysis, but rather in adding a new perspective to the metaphor of private 
property that is designed for personal use.432 
The benefit of this approach is threefold.  First, the idea of an 
intermediate space is not tied down to the very narrow conception of the 
 
 425. See infra Part VI. 
 426. See supra note 387 and accompanying text. 
 427. See infra Part VI. 
 428. See Alexander, supra note 278; Singer, supra note 278; Stern, supra note 87. 
 429. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 418, at 567–69; Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, The 
Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 85–88 (2004). 
 430. See supra notes 276–77 and accompanying text. 
 431. See Dagan & Heller, supra note 418, at 572–74. 
 432. See also Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1369, 1373 (2013) (providing a nuanced property analysis based on justified expectations).  
See generally DAGAN, supra note 278 (defining property as a set of social institutions that serve as 
default frameworks for interpersonal interaction). 
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home and neighborhood.433  It provides a conceptual opportunity to think of 
the home as a platform for multiple interactions.  Contrary to the pure and 
isolated sanctuary that is built within a homogenous community, there is a 
possibility of a more diverse, though not entirely heterogeneous and 
pluralistic, environment.434  Second, this approach supports autonomy 
because it allows people to signal their chosen personality on the spectrum 
between private, commercial, and open to others.  Third, this approach is 
responsive to the new ways in which people are using their property and 
allows for flexibility in shaping the rules regarding such consumption 
property.435  It goes beyond binary distinctions between full-blown 
protection of the home and a non-protective approach and calls for a 
nuanced set of rules that apply to this new category in the era of the sharing 
economy.436  Conceiving consumption property as a personal space and 
platform for interaction thus provides an opportunity for rethinking current 
rules that stem from the distinction between private and public or intimate 
and commercial.  
VI. RETHINKING LEGAL DOCTRINES 
The sharing economy is gradually changing practices of consumption,437 
and thus it necessarily continues to push the boundaries of consumption 
property.  It blurs familiar distinctions between intimate property and a place 
of business, leading to new questions regarding the scope of legal protection 
of intimacy, privacy, and autonomy.  Faced with other spatial challenges to 
legal categories, several scholars have advocated for dismissing property 
categories altogether and replacing it with a focus on relationships and 
substantive human interests.438  This Article argues instead that property 
categories do matter, and that spatial distinctions may prove valuable.439  Yet 
 
 433. See Fox, supra note 91, at 600–01. 
 434. Cf. Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 891–93 (2007). 
 435. See LEHAVI, supra note 71, at 179–80 (describing the drawbacks to a classical conception of 
property). 
 436. See Radin, supra note 49, at 978–79. 
 437. See BUCZYNSKI, supra note 7, at 17. 
 438. See Rosenbury, supra note 434, at 891–92 (arguing that “the actual location . . . matters 
much less than do the actors who engage in the socialization of children in those spaces”); Stern, 
supra note 68, at 905 (arguing against strict protection of the home and for replacing an emphasis on 
the physical home with an emphasis on private interests and intimate association). 
 439. See supra Part III.B. 
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these categories have to be mindful of the use and function of the property.  
Therefore, legal rules should replace the intimate or commercial binary with 
a more nuanced approach, even at the cost of reaching conflicting solutions 
in different areas of the law.440  The nexus of connection model 
acknowledges that the same property can be intimate and commercial and 
that regulation, eminent domain, insurance, fair housing, zoning, and public 
accommodations laws should treat this hybrid use differently.441  What 
seems like a loss in legal coherence442 is actually a distinct understanding of 
the category based on the role that intimacy, autonomy, or privacy plays in 
each of these doctrines.  Once we accept that personal assets have various 
functions, we can begin to rethink the role of intimacy, privacy, and 
autonomy in crafting legal rules. 
Some doctrines remain unfettered by the changes of modern 
consumption.443  Eminent domain rules and Fourth Amendment protection 
single out consumption property as a source of individual safety, control, 
and privacy.444  The home’s purpose, in these cases, is to create a secure 
space where one can control his environment.445  The sharing economy, with 
its mixture of intimate and commercial aspects, does not fundamentally 
challenge the freedom-oriented rationale of these doctrines.446 
Yet, the sharing economy transforms the role of intimacy, privacy, and 
autonomy in other areas of the law.  Legal regulations, such as tax law, 
business permits, and insurance codes, often engage in boundary setting 
between categories of living.447  Business permits and taxes distinguish 
 
 440. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); Aldo Schiavello, On “Coherence” and 
“Law”: An Analysis of Different Models, 14 RATIO JURIS. 233, 235 (2001). 
 441. See infra Part VI.A–.B. 
 442. See DWORKIN, supra note 440; Schiavello, supra note 440, at 242. 
 443. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 444. See Barros, supra note 81, at 259; Peñalver, supra note 80, at 2974; Stern, supra note 68, at 
913; see also Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of 
Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 713, 727 (2008) (discussing personal control in eminent domain). 
 445. Nadler & Diamond, supra note 444, at 746; see also Fox, supra note 91, at 590 (“[H]ome as 
a territory offers security and control, a locus in space, permanence and continuity and privacy.”); 
Radin, supra note 49, at 957. 
 446. See Barros, supra note 81, at 257 (discussing freedom in search and seizures); Katherine M. 
McFarland, Privacy and Property: Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Mandate for Stricter Scrutiny 
for Government Uses of Eminent Domain, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 142, 155 (2004). 
 447. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2022–23 (1996).  
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between locations and types of activity.448  They regulate actions by creating 
a set of incentives that affect economic choices and communicate a social 
message regarding the desirability and normative value of a given 
practice.449  Rules should thus acknowledge the variety of choices that the 
sharing economy provides and allow owners to engage with their property 
without classifying the use in one of the two dichotomous possibilities.450  In 
the context of a regulation, the law should develop subcategories to allow for 
multiple uses of consumption property.451 
Lawyers should also rethink the scope of intimate association protection 
in property law.  Property is a platform for interaction with others,452 and 
different types of property beget different types of relations.453  Property 
rules allow owners to choose whether and with whom to share their property 
in the private sphere but regulate these choices in the public arena.454  
Consumption property breeds intimacy and relations based on familial 
affection, friendship, and trust.455  Commercial property is a platform for 
market transactions based on self-interest and utility.456  This sharp division 
has significant legal implications, especially in the case of discrimination.457  
Because the sharing economy challenges the distinction, the law of 
discrimination has to adapt.  As this Part explains, owners can choose a type 
of use for their property, which can be a mixture of intimate and 
commercial, but not the legal ramifications of said use.458  New 
subcategories should be based on the type of use, the preferences of the 
owner, and the nature of interaction. 
The changing form of consumption property affects the community as 
well.459  If people open up their homes, their cars, and their personal 
belongings to others, their neighbors become exposed to a flow of 
 
 448. See infra notes 552–60 and accompanying text. 
 449. See Dagan, supra note 416, at 105; Dagan & Heller, supra note 418. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. 
 452. See generally Nedelsky, supra note 87; Singer, supra note 87. 
 453. See generally Singer, supra note 87. 
 454. See infra Part VI.A. 
 455. See supra Part IV.A. 
 456. See supra Part IV.A. 
 457. See infra Part VI.A.1–.2. 
 458. See supra notes 449–57 and accompanying text. 
 459. See Barros, supra note 81, at 289. 
[Vol. 43: 61, 2015] Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
110 
strangers.460  They are forced to give up their intimacy.461  On the one hand, 
zoning laws have to be mindful of the freedom of individuals to 
commercially share their consumption property by supporting efficiency, 
sustainability, and integration.462  On the other hand, zoning laws must be 
mindful of the possible negative externalities for the neighborhood.463 
The rationales for protecting intimacy in consumption property are 
varied.  Each of these examples employs a different aspect of this protection 
and is distinctively challenged by the sharing economy phenomenon.  The 
answer lies in targeting the specific challenge in any given doctrine and 
reconstructing the category accordingly.  In doing so, one must engage with 
the values, purposes, and interests that the sharing economy promotes 
because these interests complicate the treatment of intimacy, privacy, and 
autonomy.464  In the previous Part, three main values and interests were 
discussed: efficiency, a platform for interaction, and sustainability.465 
In order to demonstrate the usefulness of this nuanced approach and 
provide substance to the new understanding of the category, this Part 
considers in more depth two sets of legal doctrines: (1) the boundaries of 
freedom of intimate association in property transactions, namely fair housing 
and public accommodation law;466 and (2) taxation and regulation of 
consumption property in the era of the sharing economy.467  The purpose of 
these examples is twofold: First, to add an important perspective to current 
debates that is particularly relevant to the sharing economy.  Second, to 
demonstrate the limits of contemporary binaries.  I do not, however, intend 
to offer a comprehensive account of the issues nor suggest new rules for 
immediate consideration. 
A. Consumption Property, Intimacy, and Equality 
The legal protection of intimacy becomes complicated when the 
 
 460. See ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 213–14. 
 461. Id. 
 462. See supra notes 216–27 and accompanying text.  
 463. See supra notes 228–32 and accompanying text. 
 464. See, e.g., ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 213–14. 
 465. See supra Part V. 
 466. See infra Part VI.A.1. 
 467. See infra Part VI.B. 
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property is used personally but at the same time is open to the public.468  In 
the sharing economy, do owners enjoy freedom of intimate associations? 
The protection of intimacy in the law is complex and has different 
manifestations in different contexts.469  This Part discusses a specific legal 
question within the context of intimacy and property law.470  It concerns the 
owner’s prerogative to choose with whom to share her property.471  
Generally, an owner can decide who she wants to invite to her home for 
dinner, to lend her car to, or to trade her gardening tools or books with.472  
This model of ownership and intimacy is based on the much-discussed right 
to exclude, which allows owners to exclude others from engaging with the 
owner’s property.473  Although some scholars characterize the right to 
exclude as fundamentally social,474 conceptual theories of exclusion focus on 
the right of the individual to exert control over her property.  In other words, 
she is the “supreme agenda setter for the resource.”475 
However, the prerogative to choose cooperative interaction is also 
supported by a broader conception of property law.476  According to scholars 
that emphasize the social and relational aspects of ownership, property 
cannot be adequately understood and theorized without considering the ways 
people share property and cooperate in property-related projects.477  Indeed, 
sharing that successfully builds on cooperation with others strengthens 
interpersonal relations and is good in and of itself.478  People enjoy 
 
 468. Cf. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 626 (1980); 
Nancy Catherine Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO. 
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 269, 274 (2006) (emphasizing the legal protection of intimate association as a 
private and personal right). 
 469. See Marcus, supra note 468, at 274–75; see also Karst, supra note 468. 
 470. See infra notes 472–13 and accompanying text. 
 471. See infra notes 472–13 and accompanying text. 
 472. See Tim Iglesias, Does Fair Housing Law Apply to “Shared Living Situations”?  Or, the 
Trouble with Roommates, 22 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 111, 115 (2014) 
(“We do not apply antidiscrimination norms to whom you invite to dinner at your home or whom 
you befriend.”). 
 473. See supra notes 276–81 and accompanying text; see also Henry Smith, Property as the Law 
of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693–94 (2012).  
 474. See James Penner, Ownership, Co-Ownership, and the Justification of Property Rights, in 
PROPERTIES OF LAW 166, 166–67 (Timothy Endicott, Joshua Geltzer & Edwin Peel eds., 2006); see 
also Merrill & Smith, supra note 276, at 1891–92 (highlighting the social utility in exclusion). 
 475. Katz, supra note 276, at 278. 
 476. See infra notes 477–82 and accompanying text. 
 477. See generally Nedelsky, supra note 87; Rose, supra note 342; Stern, supra note 87. 
 478. Dagan & Heller, supra note 418, 572–73. 
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cooperating, which may foster a sense of unity, trust, or intimacy.479  
Choosing to interact with others is therefore a positive attribute of 
autonomous ownership, not only a form of negative freedom.480  This 
approach is sensitive not only to freedom of association but also to the 
importance of relationships and possible responsibilities that stem from such 
engagements. 
This is all true of property law for intimate locations.481  But when we 
discuss a place of business, this prerogative is significantly curtailed.  There 
are several federal and state laws that restrict the owner’s choice of 
association.482  The right to exclude in a commercial context is limited in 
order to prevent business owners from discriminating when providing 
services.483  The justification for this limitation is that certain “preferences 
and habits are not acceptable or conducive in the public realm.”484  When 
individuals enter the public space, they are no longer free to choose their 
conduct or values.485  In other words, “by opening one’s property to the 
public for business purposes, the owner waives a part of her right to 
exclude.”486  An alternative justification focuses on protection from market 
power.487 
This argument is deeply rooted in the dichotomy between intimate and 
commercial locations.  It is, in essence, a spatial argument that relies on 
distinctions between private and open to the public, between intimate and 
business.488  The underlying assumption is that there are different audiences 
involved.  A place of business serves the public, and the home is meant to 
 
 479. Id. at 573–74. 
 480. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 121–72, reprinted in 
LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002); see also 
DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY 252 (1997) (explaining that property provides space for autonomy and self-realization, 
associated with both liberty and personhood).  
 481. See supra notes 477–80 and accompanying text. 
 482. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2012); 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12955 (West 2011); FLA. STAT. §§ 760.20–.60 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
515-3 (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41a-4 (2013). 
 483. Iglesias, supra note 472, at 114–15. 
 484. Id. at 114. 
 485. Id. 
 486. Singer, supra note 45, at 1448. 
 487. Berle, supra note 2; Peñalver, supra note 77, at 23. 
 488. See supra notes 482–85 and accompanying text. 
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serve household members.  Yet the sharing economy, and the changing 
patterns of consumption that come with it, challenge this premise.  The 
challenge calls for a new discussion of the boundaries of intimacy in 
property law.  It requires thinking about the home, private car, and other 
personal possessions as an intermediate space and reconsidering the role of 
intimacy in these locations.  This Part considers two contemporary debates: 
fair housing and public accommodation in personal consumption property. 
1. Fair Housing 
Recent legal scholarship has struggled with the question of whether 
federal and state fair housing acts apply to shared living situations and the 
associated advertising.489  First, one must review the legal framework for 
housing discrimination.  The first important law is the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, which prohibits racial discrimination in property transactions.490  
According to the Act, all citizens have the same right to “inherit, purchase, 
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.”491  Racial 
discrimination in housing is thus illegal with no exemptions.492  Another 
significant law is the federal Fair Housing Act that prohibits discrimination 
in the sale or rental of housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
familial status, or national origin.493  State housing acts occasionally expand 
the list of protected groups and make discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, source of income, or familial responsibilities illegal.494  Unlike 
the Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 includes exemptions.495  
Most important for this discussion is the so-called Mrs. Murphy 
exemption,496 which stipulates that dwellings intended for occupation by 
four or fewer families are beyond the reach of the law if the owner lives in 
 
 489. Iglesias, supra note 472, at 111; Messerly, supra note 236, at 1951–53; James D. Walsh, 
Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 605, 630 (1999); Kevin M. Wilemon, Comment, The Fair Housing Act, 
the Communications Decency Act, and the Right of Roommate Seekers to Discriminate Online, 29 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 375, 377 (2009); Wright, supra note 240, at 1341–42.  
 490. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012). 
 491. Id. 
 492. See id. 
 493. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–31 (2012). 
 494. Messerly, supra note 236, at 1957. 
 495. § 3603(b). 
 496. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 101, at 433 (explaining that during congressional deliberation 
on the Act, the exemption was discussed as an imagined Mrs. Murphy’s boarding house).  
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one of the units.497  The exemption applies to most shared living 
arrangements and allows owners to discriminate between potential 
roommates.498  Despite this exemption, however, discriminatory advertising 
is still prohibited.499  Publishing any statement, notice, or advertisement 
based on protected classification is illegal.500  Therefore, while an owner can 
discriminate at the door based on sex or religion, she cannot advertise a 
discriminating ad based on these criteria.501 
This framework is the legal background for a recent Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals decision.502  In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommate.com, L.L.C.,503 the court had to decide whether the Fair Housing 
Act applies to a commercial website that helps people find roommates.504  
The website required users to disclose information about their sex, sexual 
orientation, and familial status and matches potential roommates 
accordingly.505  The Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley claimed 
that this requirement violated the Fair Housing Act.506  Because the Act 
makes it illegal to “make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or 
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or 
rental of a dwelling”507 that is discriminatory, the court had to interpret the 
meaning of the term “dwelling” and determine whether it applies to shared 
living arrangements.508  In its opinion, the court read dwelling to mean an 
independent housing unit.509  Any other interpretation would, according to 
the court, deprive people of their constitutional right to intimate 
 
 497. § 3603(b)(2); see also Walsh, supra note 489 (describing the Mrs. Murphy exemption and its 
background). 
 498. Messerly, supra note 236, at 1959.  Messerly points out that large-scale shared living 
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 499. § 3604(c). 
 500. Id.; Messerly, supra note 236, at 1959. 
 501. § 3604(c). 
 502. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, L.L.C., 666 F.3d 1216, 1216 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
 503. Id. 
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 505. Id. at 1218. 
 506. Id. 
 507. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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association.510  This right includes “the freedom to enter into and carry on 
certain intimate or private relationships.”511 
The court’s analysis goes beyond the issue of advertising and stresses 
the importance of intimacy in the home and the inevitable compromise of 
privacy when living with others: 
Aside from immediate family or a romantic partner, it’s hard to 
imagine a relationship more intimate than that between roommates, 
who share living rooms, dining rooms, kitchens, bathrooms, even 
bedrooms . . . .  The home is the center of our private lives.  
Roommates note our comings and goings, observe whom we bring 
back at night, hear what songs we sing in the shower, see us in 
various stages of undress and learn intimate details most of us prefer 
to keep private.  Roommates also have access to our physical 
belongings and to our person.512 
 
This perception of intimacy is entangled with privacy, or rather with the 
access of people to the private lives of their roommates.513  Indeed, both 
supporters and critics of the court’s approach share the focus on intimacy.514  
While supporters highlight intimacy as an inescapable element of living with 
others,515 critics stress the wide variety of shared living arrangements516 and 
emphasize, in a similar vein, the business aspects of roommate 
agreements.517  People typically live with roommates in order to save costs 
 
 510. Id. 
 511. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987). 
 512. Fair Hous. Council, 666 F.3d at 1221. 
 513. ZELIZER, supra note 253, at 213. 
 514. See, e.g., Iglesias, supra note 472, at 133 (critiquing the court’s approach, arguing that it 
ignores the commercial aspects of the transaction); Messerly, supra note 236, at 1965–68 
(supporting the position that the right of choice in shared living is based on the right to privacy and 
intimate association); Wright, supra note 240, at 1355–56 (“Home is a sanctuary where privacy is 
expected and because most intimate associations are centered in the home.”).  
 515. See Messerly, supra note 236, at 1978 (“The right to choice acknowledges that the 
roommate-housemate relationship has the potential to become a deep, intimate relationship where 
mutual support, companionship, and trust play integral parts.”); Wright, supra note 240, at 1355–57 
(stressing the importance of intimacy in the home).  
 516. See Iglesias, supra note 472, at 127–30 (indicating that there are four common types of 
roommate relationships: independent living, which is purely commercial; compatibility; active 
companion; and intimate companionship). 
 517. Walsh, supra note 489, at 613 (asserting that by publicly renting one is involved in a 
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or earn money as part of a commercial transaction.518 
The sharing economy reveals a continuum of possibilities between the 
two extremes that the current binary view fails to appreciate.519  Instead, the 
law should employ subcategories that focus on the type of use, the owner’s 
preferences, and the nature of the interaction with users. 
First, the use of property has to preserve a core of intimacy for the 
property to be regarded as a home, a private car, or any other personal 
consumption property.520  It cannot be purely commercial.521  A host that 
rents out an apartment that he does not live in is not opening up his personal 
space.  The apartment is simply business property.  In this sense, the New 
York distinction mentioned earlier is perfectly logical.522  According to New 
York regulations, only owners or tenants that are living in the property can 
legally rent their apartments for short periods of time.523 
This brings us to the Mrs. Murphy exemption524 and how it applies to 
the sharing economy.  This exemption has been forcefully criticized because 
it is much too wide to protect intimacy in the home.525  A landlord that rents 
out four units does not necessarily interact with her tenants.  The problem 
with this critique is that in extenuating the business aspect of the transaction, 
it often ignores other aspects of the use of property.526  The nexus of 
connections offers a new perspective for thinking about this exemption.527  
Unlike a binary set of categories, a perception of personal space allows us to 
think of the home as an open environment for interaction without reducing it 
to a place of business. 
 
business). 
 518. Iglesias, supra note 472, at 121.  
 519. Id. (noting that the court in Roommate.com only mentioned the business aspect twice). 
 520. See generally Messerly, supra note 236, at 1961–64 (emphasizing the right to privacy and 
that “privacy and property unite in the context of shared living”). 
 521. See Walsh, supra note 489, at 608 (“The relationships involved in [rental] situations are 
clearly and unmistakably of a much closer and more personal nature than in the case of major 
commercial establishments.” (quoting BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1194 (1970))). 
 522. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4 (McKinney 2011). 
 523. Id. 
 524. See Messerly, supra note 236, at 1959. 
 525. See Walsh, supra note 489, at 606 (“Congress drew the line in the wrong place, rendering the 
exemption over-inclusive as a protector of liberty.”). 
 526. See, e.g., id.; Iglesias, supra note 472, at 127–28 (recognizing the possible different types of 
roommate relationships, but emphasizing the commercial aspects of “independent living” or 
“compatibility”).  
 527. See supra Part VI. 
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In the context of discrimination, a new platform for interaction with 
others is particularly important.  Because the sharing economy opens up a 
new sphere of interaction and exchange, discrimination based on race,528 
color, religion, familial status, or national origin undermines this purpose 
and the values it stands for.  The power of this phenomenon lies in its 
potential for connecting people of different age groups, income levels, sexes, 
and races within the context of a private and intimate setting.  On the other 
hand, the possibility of connectivity should not distract us from the personal 
dimension of the property and the importance of intimacy, security, and 
safety in the home.  Therefore, when a woman living alone does not feel 
comfortable renting a room to a man because she fears for her personal 
safety, the personal dimension of the property becomes prominent.529 
The specific balance of intimacy and diverse interaction is intricate.  
Owners have substantially different uses and preferences for their 
property.530  The nexus of connection model stresses the owner’s ability to 
choose how to shape her personal space, but not the legal implications of 
said choice.  People can choose a very intimate and secluded space or 
instead opt for an intermediate space where the personal and commercial 
aspects of the property coexist.531 
In the sharing economy, personal spaces can be characterized by 
significant commercial aspects and can be open to the public in a way that 
calls for rethinking the Mrs. Murphy exemption.532  Although this Article 
does not claim to be a conclusive argument, intimacy can no longer serve as 
an all-inclusive exemption.533  A more nuanced approach might consider the 
frequency of sharing transactions and the intensity of the interaction.  Some 
owners rent out a room in the house they currently live in and share their 
living room, kitchen, and bathroom with guests.534  Others rent out their 
 
 528. See supra notes 493–500 and accompanying text. 
 529. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12927(c)(2)(B) (2015) (allowing for advertisements that 
“imply that the housing being advertised is available only to persons of one sex” in cases where 
sharing living areas in a single unit are involved).  
 530. See supra Part III.C. 
 531. See supra note 472 and accompanying text. 
 532. See also Walsh, supra note 489, at 614–16 (suggesting that the Mrs. Murphy exemption 
should not apply when it is a mere “collection of persons”). 
 533. See id. 
 534. See generally Tomio Geron, Airbnb Had $56 Million Impact on San Francisco: Study, 
FORBES (Nov. 9, 2012, 3:00 AM), http://forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/11/09/study-airbnb-had-
56-million-impact-on-san-francisco/ (“Airbnb hosts made an average of $9,300 annually for listing a 
home and $6,900 for listing a private room or shared space.”). 
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home only when they are on vacation.  If a room in the home is routinely 
rented to guests, and if it is a fairly separate unit, then the open-to-the-public 
elements are prominent.535  Similarly, a room that is rarely rented out to 
strangers and where houseguests effectively live with the owners makes a 
stronger case for intimacy.536  To sum up, the model insists that an analysis 
should focus on the purpose and characteristics of the project, rather than 
simply applying a dichotomy between private and commercial use.  The law 
should develop subcategories based on the type of use and frequency of 
interaction, the owner’s preferences, and the nature of the interaction with 
users. 
2. Public Accommodation 
A consideration of public accommodation law complements the fair 
housing analysis by applying the argument to a broader market.  Although 
some of the provisions in public accommodation law affect housing,537 the 
focus in this subpart is on rental markets.  Public accommodation law 
generally prohibits discrimination against protected classes in places that are 
open to the public and accept or solicit the patronage of the general public.538  
The term “public accommodation” was devised by drafters of discrimination 
laws to separate the public sphere from more private places, such as schools, 
workplaces, and homes.539 
State and federal public accommodation laws differ in the list of 
protected classes, the list of places and markets that count as public 
accommodations, and the remedies available.540  Several state laws include 
 
 535. See supra notes 486–89 and accompanying text. 
 536. Cf  ELLICKSON, supra note 90, 263–64 (discussing the benefits of having a trustworthy 
relationship with the landlord). 
 537. An interesting discussion is whether Airbnb hosts are, in fact, operating a hotel because they 
provide short-term rentals of housing units.  Yet according to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, “a 
building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by 
the proprietor of such establishment as his residence” is exempt.  42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1) (2012). 
 538. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 92A (2014) (banning owners of public 
accommodations use of advertisements “intended to discriminate against or actually discriminating 
against persons of any religious sec, creed, class, race, color, denomination, sex, sexual orientation . . 
. nationality, or because of . . . any physical or mental disability”). 
 539. See Lisa Gabrielle Lerman & Annette K. Sanderson, Comment, Discrimination in Access to 
Public Places: A Survey of State and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 215, 217–18 (1978).  
 540. Id. 
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rental establishments541 or a broad definition of public accommodations that 
may include the rental market.542  Yet these laws still employ exemptions 
and limitations.543  The pertinent New Jersey law explains that “[n]othing 
herein contained shall be construed to include or to apply to any institution, 
bona fide club, or place of accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly 
private.”544 
Should these laws apply to a person renting her car through Turo, 
Getaround, or JustShareIt?  Should it apply to people renting out their drills, 
bikes, or gardening tools through NeighborGoods?  As the previous subpart 
explained, the sharing economy challenges the dichotomy of open to the 
public and private.  Under current law, an argument can be made that renting 
out one’s own car occasionally is not an instance of public accommodation.  
Moreover, enforcing public accommodation laws will arguably deter 
individuals from engaging in a resource-saving and environmentally friendly 
activity.545 
We must rethink current property distinctions and consider a richer 
analysis of the values involved in the nexus of connection model.  Rather 
than suggest a comprehensive solution, this Article encourages scholars to 
rethink the basic premise of the problem and employ a wider set of 
categories and values.  First, the values of sustainability and efficiency are 
especially important with regard to cars.546  Cars are underutilized in current 
modern reality, leading to heavy traffic, pollution, and high-density levels.547  
When owners a priori limit certain transactions based on race, class, or 
gender, they are limiting consumers’ ability to use—rather than own—
property and thereby indirectly damage the goals of sustainability and 
 
 541. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 92A; NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.050 (2007). 
 542. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.403 (2013); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (2007).  But see Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in 
Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 821 n.13 (1991) (“State civil and human rights 
statutes also fail explicitly to protect either women or blacks from discrimination in the sale of 
consumer goods and services.”). 
 543. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes an exemption for particular types of hotels.  See supra 
note 537 and accompanying text; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 651.050.   
 544. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l).   
545. See Richard A. Epstein, Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why 
Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1277–87 (2014) 
(discussing public accommodations in small business). 
 546. See Cho & Rogel, supra note 196, at 168. 
 547. See id. at 167. 
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efficient use.548  Second, changing patterns of consumption could eventually 
lead to an important amount of public interaction within the private sphere.  
Some individuals choose to shape their property as an intermediate space 
that is partially open to the public.  The potential of such spatiality depends 
on their inclusiveness and connectivity.  The platform for interaction 
consideration stresses the symbolic harms of discrimination.549  According to 
these values, the frequency of rental transactions and the identity of the 
people that use the property are important guidelines.  When an individual 
rents out his car every Thursday to complete strangers, he is engaging in the 
public space more than an individual that occasionally rents out his car to 
mostly neighbors and acquaintances. 
B. Taxation and Regulation 
Various tax codes and local regulations have attempted to regulate the 
sharing economy phenomenon.  Some of these regulations are based on a 
strict distinction between the home and the hotel and between personal 
consumption and commercial use.550  Others offer a more nuanced 
approach.551  I will give one example of each strategy.  First consider, for 
example, the fairly recent statement by Airbnb that it will collect and remit a 
14% hotel occupancy fee in San Francisco.552  The transient occupancy tax is 
collected from all Airbnb transactions in the area, provided the reservation is 
for twenty-nine nights or shorter.553  This statement complies with article 7 
of the San Francisco Business and Tax Regulations Code.554  According to 
the Code, a transient occupancy tax applies to hotels or guest rooms.555  A 
hotel is defined as “[a]ny structure . . . containing guest rooms and which is 
occupied, or is intended or designated for occupation, by guests, whether 
 
 548. See Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz, Why Discrimination Is Bad for Business, AGENDA (Mar. 6, 
2015), https://agenda.weforum.org/2015/03/why-discrimination-hurts-competitiveness/. 
 549. See Singer, supra note 45, at 1448; supra note 486 and accompanying text. 
 550. See infra notes 558–61 and accompanying text. 
 551. See infra notes 562–63 and accompanying text. 
 552. See Kerr, supra note 193. 
 553. See id. 
 554. See S.F., CAL., BUSINESS AND TAX REGULATIONS CODE art. 7, § 501(g) (2015) (noting a 
permanent resident is a person who has occupied “any guest room in a hotel for at least 30 
consecutive days”). 
 555. Id. §§ 501–04.  
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rent is paid in money, goods, labor, or otherwise.”556  The definition 
highlights the main use of a structure and appears to single out large and 
small commercial hotels.557  Yet, according to the new arrangement for 
Airbnb users, even hosts that rent out a room for only a few nights a year 
will be considered hotels for the purpose of the tax.558  The frequency of 
sharing transactions and their characteristics are not even considered in 
collecting the tax.559  The owners’ use and preferences in shaping the 
contours of their property are not considered.  In the dichotomy between 
home and hotel, this arrangement classifies all sharing economy transactions 
as purely commercial.  The nexus of connection model requires a more 
nuanced arrangement, one that is sensitive to the characteristics of the 
property, the type of use, and the frequency and nature of sharing 
transactions.560  Although tax rules require simple and clear guidelines,561 
this Article encourages policymakers to consider these criteria in devising a 
rule. 
A different example draws on the regulation of business licenses in local 
governments.  Generally, in considering insurance rules or business permits, 
lawyers have to recognize the economic and ecological contribution of the 
sharing economy.562  Restrictive regulations may result in a chilling effect, 
limiting the efficient use of personal consumption property.563  On the other 
hand, negative externalities regarding safety, cleanliness, and density are 
also important.564 
In Grand Rapids, Michigan, new regulations allow owners to rent out 
rooms via websites such as Airbnb, with several important restrictions.565  
 
 556. Id. § 501.  Note that the definition does not specify the inclusion of “private residences” but 
is otherwise broadly drawn, and includes “any lodginghouse, roominghouse, [and] dormitory.”  Id. 
 557. See id. 
 558. Kerr, supra note 193. 
 559. See id. 
 560. See supra notes 423–27 and accompanying text. 
 561. Stanley S. Surrey & Gerard M. Brannon, Simplification and Equity as Goals of Tax Policy, 9 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 915, 915 (1968) (“It must appear to an observer of the tax scene that 
simplification is the most widely quoted but the least widely observed of the goals of tax policy.”). 
 562. See generally JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING 
PEOPLE BUILD COOPERATIVES, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY (2013) 
(discussing the different areas of law that a “sharing lawyer” must know about in today’s society). 
 563. Cf. Epstein, supra note 545, at 1277–87; supra note 545 and accompanying text. 
 564. See NADLER, supra note 397, at 8; supra note 397 and accompanying text. 
 565. See generally GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., CITY CODE tit. V, ch. 61, art. 5, §§ 5.5.01–.05 (2015); 
id. tit. VII, ch. 116, art. 7, §§ 7.640–.651.  
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An owner must obtain a formal permit.566  In order to get a permit, the 
property must be the principal dwelling of the owner during the rental 
activity, the license is subject to a fee, only one room can be rented, and all 
owners and residents within 300 feet of the property must be notified.567  A 
zoning ordinance in Portland, Oregon has adopted similar regulations.568  
These regulations strike a balance between competing values.569  They 
permit sharing economy transactions while also minimizing negative 
externalities.  More importantly, they do not fall into the familiar dichotomy 
of home and hotel, intimate and commercial.570  The license creates a new 
category of a home (the owner must occupy the property) that has an 
additional commercial function and is regulated in order to address the 
concerns of the nearby community.571  It acknowledges the complexity of 
the consumption property category. 
These two examples demonstrate the wide range of legal tools available 
to local governments and regulators in regulating sharing economy 
transactions.  Other regulations potentially include zoning laws, consumer 
protection laws, and insurance codes.  In the heat of regulation, 
policymakers must be careful neither to replicate an outdated conception of 
consumption property nor simply reclassify the home as a commercial 
enterprise.  The nexus of connection model for consumption property offers 
more sophisticated solutions that acknowledge the richness of the 
consumption property category. 
 
 566. See GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., CITY CODE tit. V, ch. 61, art. 5 §§ 5.5.01–.05; see also Josh 
Sidorowicz, Airbnb Licensing to Pick up Speed in GR, City Manager Promises Enforcement, FOX 17 
W. MICH. (Nov. 13, 2014, 11:25 PM), http://fox17online.com/2014/11/13/airbnb-licensing-to-pick-
up-speed-in-gr-city-manager-promises-enforcement/. 
 567. GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., CITY CODE tit. V, ch. 61, art. 5 § 7.6448; see also One-Room Short-
Term Rentals Fact Sheet, CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS, http://grcity.us/city-clerk/Documents/One% 
20room%20rental%20fact%20sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).  
 568. PORTLAND, OR., ZONING CODE §§ 33.207.010–.070 (2015). 
 569. See §§ 33.207.010–.020. 
 570. Id. § 33.207.010 (“The regulations are intended to allow for a more efficient use of 
residential structures, without detracting from neighborhood character, and ensuring that the primary 
use remains residential.  In some situations, the operator can take advantage of the scale . . . of a 
residence.  The regulations also provide an alternative form of lodging for visitors who prefer a 
residential setting.”). 
 571. See id. § 33.207.040(A)(1) (noting the owner must occupy the dwelling “for at least 270 days 
during each calendar year”). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has portrayed the challenge posed by the sharing economy 
phenomenon to a unique property category.  The changing patterns of 
consumption in the modern economy are pushing and altering the old 
boundaries between commercial and personal consumption property.572  
Multiple uses of assets and property create a fragmented, rather than 
coherent, concept of personal possessions.  This Article has presented a new 
way of thinking about the category of consumption property and emphasized 
the potential of the sharing economy to create an intermediate space that 
allows for connectivity and multiple types of relationships.573 
This new framework makes it necessary to rethink various legal 
doctrines, some of which have been discussed in this Article.574  Other 
doctrines, such as zoning rules and insurance, were not explicitly discussed 
but are also unsettled by the challenge to the distinction between business 
and intimate, private and open to the public, and may equally require 
reconstruction. 
However, the challenges of the sharing economy to property law do not 
stop at the door of personal consumption property.  The sharing economy 
holds the potential to revolutionize basic property concepts of acquisition, 
ownership, possession, and use rights by ultimately shifting the focus of 
property law and challenging its longstanding conventions.  This vision has 
yet to materialize, but it might be lurking in the shadows, and it definitely 
merits reflection.  This Article is a first step in grappling with the effect of 
the sharing economy on property law and theory. 
  
 
 572. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text. 
 573. See supra Part VI. 
 574. See supra Part VI. 
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